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I.   INTRODUCTION  
 During the past few years, the debate over whether health care 
professionals should be required to provide services that conflict with 
their personal beliefs has focused primarily on pharmacists refusing 
to fill prescriptions.1 According to one media account, during a six-
month period in 2004 there were approximately 180 reports of phar-
macists refusing to dispense routine or emergency oral contracep-
tives.2 This controversy, however, extends beyond the pharmacy into 
every facet of the heath care system.  
 Consider the following case: Yvonne Shelton, a staff nurse work-
ing in the labor and delivery unit of a public hospital, objected on re-
ligious grounds to participating in emergency procedures on preterm 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., The 
George Washington University. I am grateful to Susan Ayres, Malinda Seymour, and 
Vickie Rainwater for their helpful comments. I also appreciate the invaluable assistance of 
my students Kim Donovan and James Johnson.  
 1. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the 
Eroding Moral Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83 (2006); Dennis Rambaud, Note, 
Prescription Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse: Examining the Efficacy 
of Conscience Laws, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 195 (2006). 
 2. Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, § 4, at 12.  
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patients where survival of the fetus was unlikely.3 In one situation a 
patient in her eighteenth week of pregnancy was “standing in a pool 
of blood,” necessitating an emergency cesarean-section delivery.4 
Shelton refused to assist, and eventually another nurse took her 
place.5 The hospital, claiming that Shelton’s refusal delayed the pro-
cedure for thirty minutes, informed her she could no longer work in 
the labor and delivery section because of the risk to patients.6 Shel-
ton was offered a transfer to the newborn intensive care unit or the 
opportunity to apply for another position.7 She refused the hospital’s 
proposals and, after she was terminated, filed a religious discrimina-
tion claim which the court rejected.8  
 The role of religion in the delivery of health care, particularly fam-
ily planning and reproductive health services, has been discussed ex-
tensively.9 The debate over moral refusals in health care appears to 
be intensifying for a number of reasons. Society has seen the rapid 
expansion of controversial medical technologies such as embryonic 
stem cell research, genetic testing, cloning, and in vitro fertilization. 
Political controversy erupted over the application before the FDA to 
switch Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, from prescription to 
nonprescription status.10 The physician-assisted suicide debate and 
the Terri Schiavo case brought renewed attention to end-of-life care 
issues. Finally, the growing number and size of religiously controlled 
health care institutions11 and the increase in expression of religious 
 
 3. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 4. Id. at 223 n.3. 
 5. Id. at 223. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 223-24. For further discussion of this case, see infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text. 
 9. See, e.g., William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon 
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
455 (2001); Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty 
and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. 
REV. 625 (2003); Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Pro-
viders, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993); Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Rec-
onciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1703 (1999). 
 10. The FDA recently approved nonprescription status for Plan B. FDA NEWS, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA APPROVES OVER-THE-COUNTER ACCESS FOR PLAN B FOR 
WOMEN 18 AND OLDER; PRESCRIPTION REMAINS REQUIRED FOR THOSE 17 AND UNDER (Aug. 
24, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2006/new01436.html. 
 11. Although there are many different religiously affiliated facilities, the Catholic 
health care system is the largest non-profit health care provider in the United States and 
controls over twelve percent of all hospitals and fifteen percent of all hospital admissions. 
In twenty-one states, Catholic hospitals account for more than twenty percent of all hospi-
tal admissions. THE CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Jan. 2006), http://www.chausa.org/nr/rdonlyres/68b7c0e5-f9aa-4106-b182-
7df0fc30a1ca/0/factsheet.pdf. 
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faith in public life have contributed to the growing controversy over 
providers refusing to render health care services.12
 A recent spate of legislative proposals, commonly known as con-
science clauses, have been advanced at both the state and national 
levels to address these issues. On the one hand, legislation has been 
narrowly directed at certain services, such as emergency contracep-
tives, to require that pharmacists dispense all legally prescribed 
medications. More prevalent, however, is the trend of legislation al-
lowing the free exercise of conscience by health care providers.13 Sup-
port is growing for conscience clauses that give pharmacists the right 
to veto a physician’s order, that allow physicians the option to refuse 
to discuss relevant treatment options, and that tie the hands of em-
ployers when employees refuse to provide required services. Under 
current or proposed legislation, these health care professionals can-
not be disciplined by their professional boards, sued by their pa-
tients, or subjected to employment actions by their employers for 
these refusals.  
 At least fifteen states have either enacted or considered legisla-
tion that would permit individuals to refuse to provide a broad array 
of health care services.14 These laws would also give both public and 
private entities the right to decline health care to patients or opt out 
of paying for health care services.15 The newer conscience clauses are 
not restricted to religious objections. In fact, most proposals grant 
health care providers the right to refuse to provide services for any 
ethical or moral reason. What is most worrisome, however, is that in 
many cases the right of conscientious objection has become a right 
without accompanying responsibilities, or what one columnist has 
called “conscience without consequence.”16 Little effort has been 
made to achieve a reasonable balance between providers’ and pa-
tients’ interests. In most cases, the legislation recognizes an absolute 
right to refuse to provide health care, which destroys any equilibrium 
 
 12. Also offering insight on this issue is a recent article discussing the impact the 
“culture of life” has on federal and state legislation. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: 
Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 820 (2006) (attributing the con-
troversy over emergency contraception to culture of life advocates). 
 13. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Laws 
and Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/conscienceclauses.htm (listing states 
that have passed or considered health care conscience clauses) (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.  
 15. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the refusal of health care insurers 
or other payers to cover certain services or medications (usually contraceptives). For 
treatment of this issue, see Maureen K. Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and 
Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento: Towards a New Understanding of 
Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 367 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to De-
fine Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Cover-
age Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741 (2005).  
 16. Ellen Goodman, Editorial, Dispensing Morality, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A23. 
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between these two competing interests. Employees in pharmacies or 
health facilities no longer need to demand that employers reasonably 
accommodate morally inspired conduct now that a refusal to perform 
services is protected by unconditional immunity from any legal, dis-
ciplinary, or adverse employment action.17 Few proposals require 
that the provider’s objection to specific services be conveyed to the 
patient before general care begins, and there is little recognition of 
the burden that an untimely conscientious refusal may have on the 
employer or the health care worker’s colleagues.18  
 The debate over refusal clauses is often framed as a conflict be-
tween a person’s right of access or “entitlement” to certain health 
care, such as contraceptives, and a provider’s freedom of conscience. 
From a legal perspective, this debate is misplaced.19 Although pa-
tients’ rights have evolved considerably over the past fifty years, the 
law is not so expansive as to grant an individual the privilege to in-
sist that a health care provider deliver all desired services.20 Barring 
an agreement between patient and provider or a statute mandating 
access, there is no legal duty to treat. Thus, professionals and facili-
ties are generally free to turn away prospective patients or limit the 
scope of their services without fear of liability.21 The question that is 
sometimes overlooked is: What set of rules should govern medical 
care in an existing patient-provider relationship? A carte blanche 
right to refuse continuing care or disclose certain information for 
moral reasons ignores the legal and professional obligations health 
care providers have to their patients, as well as the remedies for 
breach of those obligations available to patients, regulatory boards, 
and employers.  
 This Article addresses the tension between the legal duties of 
health care providers to their patients and the right of those provid-
ers to refuse care on grounds of conscience. To aid in the analysis, 
this Article provides examples of several areas in which conflicts may 
arise. The argument offered here is not that rights of conscience have 
no place in health care or that collective professional standards al-
ways trump personal beliefs. To the contrary, health care providers 
should not be compelled to perform acts they find morally repugnant. 
To assert, however, that rights of conscience deserve absolute defer-
ence is to ignore the fact that, unlike employees in other sectors, 
 
 17. See discussion infra Part II. 
 18. Id. 
 19. There may be valid policy reasons, however, why providers such as pharmacists 
should not be allowed to deny patients access to lawful medications, such as contracep-
tives. See Holly Teliska, Note, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Un-
dermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 229 (2005). 
 20. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 21. Id. 
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health care providers, particularly physicians, have well-established 
legal and professional duties to their patients. It is one thing to allow 
individuals to refuse to participate in isolated procedures that they 
oppose on moral grounds, such as abortion. It is another to give 
broad immunity to professionals who refuse to give appropriate 
treatment or advice to their patients. Admittedly, this is a complex 
issue with no easy resolution, as health care providers may face a 
conflict between their personal beliefs and professional standards.22 
Accommodating religious or moral beliefs in health professions re-
quires a system that not only protects health care providers from co-
ercion in the exercise of their moral conscience, but also one that en-
sures patients are not without recourse when treatment to which 
they are legally entitled is not provided.  
 Part II provides a brief background of conscience clauses and an 
overview of recent statutes and legislative proposals that expand the 
right of providers to refuse a broad spectrum of health care services. 
Part III examines whether legislative accommodations designed to 
remove a burden on the exercise of religion by providers are constitu-
tionally required. Part III also explores decisions involving religious 
refusals of care by health care workers under Title VII and the impli-
cations of recognizing nonreligious objections under broad refusal 
laws. Part IV discusses potential conflicts that may arise between the 
legal duties of health care providers and rights of refusal afforded by 
expansive conscience clause legislation. Part V suggests several ap-
proaches to challenge refusal laws under the Establishment Clause 
and federal and state laws. Part VI concludes with some reflections 
on health care rights of conscience and proposes ways that legislators 
could reasonably balance the conflicting rights of providers and their 
patients, employers, and colleagues. 
II.   BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
 The issue of health care providers conscientiously refusing to pro-
vide services is not new. Shortly after the decision in Roe v. Wade,23 
Congress passed the Church Amendment, which states that receipt 
of federal funds does not obligate health care providers to participate 
in abortion procedures if their objection is based on moral or religious 
 
 22. This is a question that confronts professionals from many religious and ethical 
backgrounds, although it may predominately affect those providers who ascribe to the 
Catholic faith. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience 
Clauses, and Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 222 
(2002) (“Roman Catholic physicians serve as paradigm cases for all whose religious be-
liefs compel them to refuse to participate in certain acts, which are legal and even ‘re-
quired’ in their societal roles.”). 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
784  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:779 
 
                                                                                                                   
grounds.24 Almost every state followed the lead of the federal gov-
ernment by enacting legislation allowing physicians, nurses, and 
some health care institutions to refuse to participate in or provide 
abortions.25 The Church Amendment and legislation in some states 
also allow providers to decline sterilization services.26  
 Since 1973, the scope of refusal legislation has greatly expanded. 
Although the early conscience clauses focused primarily on abortion, 
recent legislation seeks to expand the rights of health care providers 
to opt out of almost any health service to which the provider has a 
moral objection. For example, at the federal level, Medicaid managed 
care organizations, while otherwise prohibited from imposing “gag” 
rules on professionals, may decline to provide or cover any counseling 
or referral service if the organization “objects to the provision of such 
service on moral or religious grounds.”27 Professionals or other health 
care workers who deliver care under the Federal Employees’ Health 
Benefits Plan may refuse to discuss treatment options that are in-
consistent with their “ethical, moral, or religious beliefs.”28   
 Prolific activity on conscience clauses has been generated at the 
state level. In some states, legislation is specifically directed toward 
a particular service or services, primarily reproductive health care. 
For instance, Maine allows private institutions and physicians to re-
fuse to furnish family planning services based on a religious or con-
scientious objection.29 In South Dakota, pharmacists may object to 
dispensing medication if the pharmacist has “reason to believe” the 
medication would be used to cause an abortion or destroy an unborn 
child.30 Arkansas allows medical providers, including physicians and 
pharmacists, to refrain from providing not only contraceptive sup-
 
 24. Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(a)-(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000)). 
 25. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH 
SERVICES, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf (Oct. 1, 2006) (list-
ing states that allow individuals and institutions to refuse to provide abortion, steriliza-
tion, and contraception).  
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000); see also GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 25.  
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B)(i ) (2000). Managed care plans refusing coverage 
must disclose the restrictions to enrollees either before or during enrollment. Id. States 
must also allow enrollees open access to other health care providers willing to provide 
the services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (2000). Studies have shown, however, that most 
women do not receive accurate information about open access for family planning ser-
vices and many receive incorrect information about their plan’s provisions. See White, 
supra note 9, at 1746-47. 
 28. 48 C.F.R. § 1609.7001(c)(7) (2005). 
 29. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2004). 
 30. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004). An unborn child is defined as “an individ-
ual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” § 22-1-2(50A) 
(Supp. 2006). South Dakota also allows pharmacists to refuse to dispense medication that 
could be used to cause the death of an individual by “assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy 
killing.” § 36-11-70(3). 
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plies, but also information about contraceptives.31 In 2005 and 2006, 
bills that would allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions 
for all artificial birth control or emergency contraceptives were 
proposed in twenty-two states.32 One of the broadest efforts was in 
Minnesota, where a bill would have allowed a pharmacist to refuse 
to stock or dispense any medication which the pharmacist found 
“morally objectionable.”33
 Targeting not only the beginning but also the end of life, a bill 
passed by the Wisconsin legislature in 2005 permitted health care 
providers to refuse to participate in medical procedures (including 
counseling or referral) involving “sterilization, abortion, destruction 
of human embryos or embryo tissue, non-beneficial treatment or ex-
perimentation on in vitro embryos, use of fetal tissue, the withdrawal 
or withholding of nutrition or hydration from a non-terminally ill 
person,34 and assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.”35 Gov-
ernor Doyle vetoed the bill because he concluded it was “unconscion-
able” to let a “doctor put his or her political beliefs ahead of [a pa-
tient’s] medical best interests.”36 A bill introduced in the New York 
legislature sought to protect from malpractice or disciplinary actions 
persons who object to providing referrals, assistance, or information 
about abortion, life-sustaining medical treatment, assistance in end-
ing life, and contraception or contraceptive devices, including con-
doms intended to prevent the spread of disease.37   
 Other states are pursuing even broader conscience clauses. Mis-
sissippi’s refusal law illustrates this trend.38 In 1977, Illinois became 
the first state to enact comprehensive legislation allowing physicians, 
health care personnel, and facilities to refuse almost any service on 
religious grounds.39 The issue of whether health rights of conscience 
should be extended beyond selected services was a relatively quies-
cent one, however, until Mississippi enacted its statute in 2004. Mis-
 
 31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), -(5) (2005).  Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee also 
permit physicians and institutions to refuse to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, 
and information. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102(9) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051(6) 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001). 
 32. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 13. 
 33. Pharmacist Conscience Clause, S.F. 2430, 2005-2006 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006), 
available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S2430.0.html&session=ls84. 
The bill died in committee during the legislative session. 
 34. This would presumably include a person in a persistent vegetative state who is 
not terminally ill. 
 35. A.B. 207, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/data/AB-
207.pdf.  
 36. Letter from Jim Doyle, Governor, State of Wis., to the Wis. State Assembly (Oct. 
14, 2005), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=5111.  
 37. A.B. 9536, State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006).  The bill was not enacted by the 
end of the 2006 regular session. 
 38. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to -13 (2005).  
 39. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 70/1-70/14 (2002). 
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sissippi’s legislation was hailed by Governor Haley Barbour as part 
of a broad “pro-life agenda.”40 Yet the law goes beyond abortion, re-
productive services, or other controversial treatment by permitting a 
health care payer, institution, or provider (which includes almost 
every worker in the health care field)41 to refuse to participate in any 
health care service—including referral or counseling—for religious, 
moral, or ethical reasons.42 There is no exception for medical emer-
gencies.43 “Health care service” is defined very broadly: 
“Health care service” means any phase of patient medical care, 
treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the follow-
ing: patient referral, counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or 
prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or ad-
ministering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any 
other care or treatment rendered by health care providers or 
health care institutions. 44
Mississippi’s law grants objecting health care providers complete 
immunity from any civil, criminal, or administrative liability or sanc-
tion.45 Health care workers objecting on conscience grounds are also 
protected from a wide range of adverse employment actions.46 There 
is no exception allowing an employer to opt out of accommodating 
employees because of undue hardship.47 Indeed, even assigning an 
employee to another shift to accommodate the objection is defined as 
 
 40. Press Release, Governor Haley Barbour, Governor Haley Barbour Caps Suc-
cessful Pro-Life Agenda; Signs Four Bills (May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.governorbarbour.com/old/ProLifeAgenda.htm. 
 41. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (2006) (“ ‘Health care provider’ means any individ-
ual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service, including, but not 
limited to: a physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, nurses’ aide, medical assistant, hospi-
tal employee, clinic employee, nursing home employee, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, 
researcher, medical or nursing school faculty, student or employee, counselor, social 
worker or any professional, paraprofessional, or any other person who furnishes, or assists 
in the furnishing of, a health care procedure.”).  
 42. “Participating in a health care service” means “(t)o counsel, advise, provide, per-
form, assist in, refer for, admit for purposes of providing, or participate in providing, any 
health care service or any form of such service.” Id. § 41-107-3(f). 
 43. Federal law requires the screening and stabilization of patients with emergency 
conditions prior to discharge or transfer. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). EMTALA preempts any state law in direct conflict. 
§ 1395dd(f). However, EMTALA protects only patients who come to a hospital emergency 
department. § 1395dd(a). If the patient is admitted to the hospital for treatment, no fur-
ther duty exists under EMTALA.  See Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir. 
2002) (en banc); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (2005). Mississippi law would seemingly 
permit a conscientious refusal of care to an emergent patient outside the confines of a hos-
pital emergency department.  
 44. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-03(a) (2006).  
 45. § 41-107-5(2); § 41-107-7(2). 
 46. § 41-107-5(3). 
 47. § 41-107-11 (2). Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000), 
provides that an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs, 
unless the accommodation would constitute an undue hardship. 
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a form of unlawful discrimination.48 Finally, aggrieved persons or 
entities may seek civil damages and injunctive relief for violations 
of the act.49  
 Other states are following Mississippi’s lead. Broad conscience 
legislation permitting professionals, institutions, and payers to opt 
out of providing or paying for any health care service was intro-
duced during 2005-2007 legislative sessions in Alabama,50 Arkan-
sas,51 Michigan,52 Missouri,53 New Jersey,54 South Carolina,55 
South Dakota,56 Rhode Island,57 Texas,58 Vermont,59 Washington,60 
and West Virginia.61  
 
 48. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, health 
care provider, health care institution, public or private institution, public official, or any 
board which certifies competency in medical specialties to discriminate against any health 
care provider in any manner based on his or her declining to participate in a health care 
service that violates his or her conscience. For purposes of this chapter, discrimination in-
cludes, but is not limited to: termination, transfer, refusal of staff privileges, refusal of 
board certification, adverse administrative action, demotion, loss of career specialty, reas-
signment to a different shift, reduction of wages or benefits, refusal to award any grant, 
contract, or other program, refusal to provide residency training opportunities, or any 
other penalty, disciplinary or retaliatory action.”). 
 49. § 41-107-11 (2) (providing for treble damages of not less than $5000 and at-
torney’s fees). 
 50. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H.B. 609, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2006), 
available at http://alisdb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLogin.asp?SESSION=1033. This 
bill was not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session. 
 51. Arkansas Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 1141, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ark. 2005), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/sb1141.pdf. 
This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2005 regular session. 
 52. Conscientious Objector Accommodation Act, H.B 4660, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2007) available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-
2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-HIB-4660.pdf.  
 53. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H.B. 434, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2007), available at http://www.house.mo.gov/bills071/biltxt/intro/HB0434I.htm.  
 54. A. 2016, 212th Leg., 2006-2007 Sess. (N.J. 2007), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A2500/2016_I1.PDF. 
 55. H. 3283, Gen. Assemb., 117th Sess. (S.C. 2007), available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess117_2007-2008/bills/3283.htm. 
 56. H.B. 1184, 81st Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2006), available at 
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/bills/HB1184p.pdf. This bill was not enacted by the 
end of the 2006 regular session. 
 57. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H. 5274, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 
(R.I. 2007), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText07/HouseText07/H5274.pdf.  
 58. S.B. 1016, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/SB01016I.pdf. This bill was not enacted 
by the end of the 2005 regular session. 
 59. An Act Relating to Health Care Rights of Conscience, H. 315, 2006-2007 Legis. Sess. 
(Vt. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/bills/ 
intro/H-315.HTM. This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2007 regular session. 
 60. H.B. 1654, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1654.pdf. This bill was 
not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session.  
 61. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 41, 2006 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006), 
available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2006_SESSIONS/RS/BILLS/ 
sb41%20intr.htm. This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session. 
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 A few states have succeeded in curbing health care refusals. In re-
sponse to several well-publicized refusals to fill prescriptions for con-
traceptives, Illinois’s governor pushed through an administrative 
rule in 2005 to require pharmacies that stock FDA-approved contra-
ceptives to dispense all contraceptives “without delay,” obtain a con-
traceptive not in stock, or transfer the prescription to another phar-
macy.62 California enacted legislation making it a violation of profes-
sional duty, subject to disciplinary action, to obstruct a patient in ob-
taining a lawful prescription drug and to refuse to fill prescriptions 
based on ethical, moral, or religious grounds unless the pharmacist 
has previously notified the employer of his or her objection and the 
employer can provide a reasonable accommodation of the objection 
without undue hardship.63   
 Bills aimed at forcing pharmacists to dispense all lawfully pre-
scribed medications have been introduced in Congress.64 In addition, 
legislative proposals directing hospitals to provide information about 
and dispense emergency contraceptives on request to sexual assault 
victims are pending at the federal level. 65 To date, none of the bills 
have emerged from committee in either house.  
III.   LEGAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 
 America has a long history of accommodating religious beliefs and 
practices. Religious exemptions from state and federal laws are 
common, and serve to foster the free exercise of religious beliefs, 
practices, and worship.66 This Part begins with the basic contours of 
current law on the scope of accommodations required under the First 
 
 62. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2006) (defining contraception as any FDA-
approved drug or device to prevent pregnancy). During 2005 and 2006, five bills were in-
troduced in the Illinois legislature that would vitiate the 2005 regulation by allowing 
pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives. S.B. 2343, H.B. 4230, H.B. 
4246, H.B. 4346, H.B. 4786, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2005). In addition, after Illinois 
adopted this regulation, lawsuits were brought against the Governor, other state officials, 
and Wal-Mart, alleging pharmacists’ rights under the Illinois conscience law were violated. 
See Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-3292 (C.D. Ill. filed July 31, 2007) (denying 
Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss pharmacist’s complaint alleging violations of Title VII and the 
Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act); Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 
1005 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (denying state officials’ motion to dismiss pharmacist’s claims). 
 63. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733(a), -(b)(3) (West 2006). 
 64. Access to Birth Control Act, S. 1555, H.R. 2596, 110th Cong. (2007); Access to Le-
gal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005); To Amend the Public Health Ser-
vice Act with Respect to the Responsibilities of a Pharmacy when a Pharmacist Employed 
by the Pharmacy Refuses to Fill a Valid Prescription for a Drug on the Basis of Religious 
Beliefs or Moral Convictions, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 1539, 109th Cong. (2005).  
 65. Best Help for Rape Victims Act, H.R. 3318, 110th Cong. (2007); Compassionate 
Assistance for Rape Emergencies Act, S. 1240, H.R. 464, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 66. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An 
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (stating that religious exemptions 
might exist in over 2000 statutes). 
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Amendment. Discussion of this issue will be brief because it has been 
treated in depth elsewhere.67 Religious accommodations may also be 
legislatively mandated, most conspicuously by Title VII.68 Although 
some legislators and commentators have expressed dissatisfaction 
with the “de minimis” accommodation standard under Title VII and 
have advocated strengthening this test, most health conscience legis-
lation goes further by completely abrogating an employer’s defense of 
undue hardship.69 Recent refusal laws also expand the grounds for 
objection to include not only religious beliefs, but any moral or ethi-
cal reason. The convergence of these two provisions may mean that 
health care workers will not be subject to an adverse employment ac-
tion for any health care refusal, however detrimental to patients, 
employers, and nonobjecting employees. 
A.   Free Exercise Clause 
 The free exercise of religion is enshrined in the First Amendment, 
and most people are apt to agree that those who call on their faith in 
matters of conscience deserve both respect for their beliefs and pro-
tection from discrimination. The right to freely exercise religious be-
liefs is not unlimited, however, and the courts have often made 
judgments about the boundaries between private religious conduct 
and the public interest or harm to a third party.70 “Not all burdens on 
religion are unconstitutional. . . . The state may justify a limitation 
on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an 
overriding governmental interest.”71   
 The Free Exercise Clause targets discrimination or the burdening 
of religion by government.72 Laws requiring private employers to ac-
 
 67. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the 
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Con-
stitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.1245 (1994); Stephen 
G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT L. REV. 75 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Recon-
structing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Re-
ligion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: 
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). 
 68. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (holding 
that religious school with racially discriminatory admission policies did not qualify as a 
tax-exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 
252, 259-60 (1982) (requiring Amish employer to pay social security taxes forbidden by his 
faith); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that parents do not have a 
right under the free exercise clause to require their children to perform religiously related 
jobs in violation of child labor laws).  
 71. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 (citations omitted). 
 72. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 
(1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at is-
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commodate the religious preferences of their employees are not sub-
ject to First Amendment scrutiny, as there is no state action.73 A leg-
islative accommodation in which individuals or entities are granted 
an exemption from state interference benefits religion and is scruti-
nized not under the Free Exercise Clause, but under the Establish-
ment Clause.74 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitu-
tion demands accommodation by the federal government and the 
states in very few cases; in most circumstances, special exceptions for 
religious practices are a matter of legislative choice.75 “[T]he Free 
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot 
do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact 
from the government.”76  
 Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the First Amend-
ment does not require religious exemptions from generally applicable 
state laws; it requires only neutrality.77 States may decline to recog-
 
sue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct be-
cause it is undertaken for religious reasons.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) 
(“As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Con-
gress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express him-
self in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”). 
 73. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to 
Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 799-800 (1996) (“A private 
employer could implement work rules which limit or even nearly eliminate religious dis-
cussion; such private action is not state action and so is not reached by the Constitution.”); 
McConnell, supra note 67, at 712 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause does not reach ac-
commodations required of private employers under Title VII). 
 74. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (upholding the exemption of religious organiza-
tions from Title VII in face of Establishment Clause challenge); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (holding that state property tax exemption for religious facilities did 
not violate Establishment Clause); see also infra Part V.A (discussing whether conscience 
clauses may be subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause). 
 75. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (“[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate sig-
nificant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and 
carry out their religious missions.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 
136, 144 (1987) (“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes 
must) accommodate religious practices . . . .”).  
 76. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also 
James. M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable 
Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 551 (2004) (“Although discrimination against 
religion is subject to strict scrutiny under the Constitution, the failure to make accommo-
dations for religion is subject to no scrutiny so long as a state is acting pursuant to a neu-
tral and generally applicable policy.”); see also McConnell, supra note 67, at 687 (arguing 
that accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause are “sometimes” required). 
 77. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990) (re-
jecting compelling interest test); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531 
(“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular re-
ligious practice.”). The Smith decision led Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), in an attempt to restore the 
compelling interest test in the case of neutral, generally applicable statutes. In City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its 
power in enacting the RFRA, thereby invalidating the RFRA as applied to state and local 
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nize exceptions for religious practices from generally applicable and 
neutral laws when necessary to promote the health and welfare of its 
citizens.78 The Supreme Court has also recognized that although re-
ligious beliefs must be absolutely respected, religious conduct may be 
circumscribed.79 Thus, while in some instances legislation allowing 
health care workers and organizations to opt out of providing care on 
religious grounds may be permissible, such refusal clauses are by no 
means constitutionally compelled.80  
 Conscience laws may be desirable, for instance, when they protect 
health care workers from invidious discrimination. The broader is-
sues concern the costs of conscience laws to the rights of patients, 
coworkers, and employers. Denying exemptions where the exercise of 
religious liberty may cause harm to a patient’s health or disruption 
of care serves the interests of a pluralistic society.81  
B.   The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 Employers are subject to Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees on the ba-
sis of religion.82 Employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate 
the individual’s religious beliefs, as long as the accommodation does 
not impose an “undue hardship.”83 The Supreme Court has held that 
requiring an employer to incur more than “de minimis” cost to ac-
commodate religious belief or conduct is an undue hardship84 and 
 
governments. Some states have enacted their own RFRAs. See, e.g., Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1998, FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-.05 (2005) (applying compelling interest test).  
 78. Relying on Smith, several courts have concluded that government health policies 
that incidentally burden religious beliefs are not constitutionally infirm. See Montgomery 
v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aff’d 940 F.2d 661 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that autopsy of son conducted under state law did not violate the free 
exercise rights of mother, who opposed autopsy on religious grounds); Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 84-89 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a law re-
quiring Catholic Charities to include coverage for contraceptives did not violate the First 
Amendment); Douglas County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005) (applying ra-
tional basis test to statute requiring that infants be tested for metabolic diseases, in light 
of parents’ religious objection). 
 79. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (stating that the freedom 
to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act is not); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 166 (1878) (recognizing that although laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief 
and opinions, they may with practices”).  
 80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice 
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally 
required . . . .”).  
 81. See Clark, supra note 9, at 681 (arguing in favor of an intermediate approach to 
exemptions where necessary to prevent harm to third parties). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (2000). Many states have laws similar to Title 
VII. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2005).  
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).   
 84. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (“It would be 
anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress meant that an em-
ployer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive them 
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that an employer’s duty under Title VII is satisfied when it offers a 
reasonable accommodation to the employee.85 A number of cases involv-
ing health care workers under Title VII demonstrate the delicate bal-
ancing test courts employ in weighing the business requirements of em-
ployers and the employee’s right to refuse services on religious grounds.  
 In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, the plaintiff, a staff 
pharmacist, initially refused to work on the Sabbath.86 After the hos-
pital accommodated his request by trading Saturday shifts with 
other pharmacists, the plaintiff sought other days off for religious 
holidays.87 Eventually, the plaintiff was told the hospital would ap-
prove scheduling changes plaintiff made directly with the other 
pharmacists.88 He was unable to trade schedules for several religious 
holidays and failed to appear for work.89 After his discharge, plaintiff 
sued the hospital for religious discrimination.90 The court upheld the 
termination because the employer had attempted reasonable accom-
modation of plaintiff’s religious beliefs and plaintiff’s actions had re-
sulted in disruption of work routines, increased workload for the 
other pharmacists, and lowering of morale.91 Further accommodating 
plaintiff, by hiring another pharmacist or ordering pharmacists to trade 
shifts, the court held, would create an undue hardship on both the hos-
pital and the plaintiff’s coworkers and increase the risk to patients.92  
 Similarly, where a pharmacist who was an Orthodox Jew objected 
to selling condoms, the court suggested it would be an undue burden 
for the pharmacy to hire an additional pharmacist.93 Because the 
pharmacy had offered its employee no accommodation, however, it 
failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that alternative accommo-
dations proposed by the plaintiff would constitute an undue hard-
ship.94 For instance, the court rejected as speculative the defendant’s 
suggestion that asking customers to go to another register to pay for the 
condoms would cause a loss of customers, goodwill, and revenue.95
 A recent case illustrates the conflict that may arise between reli-
gious beliefs and a patient’s sexual orientation. The Fifth Circuit re-
 
of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, 
and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.”). 
 85. Asonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook , 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“Thus, where the em-
ployer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory 
inquiry is at an end.”). 
 86. 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 143-44. 
 90. Id. at 144. 
 91. Id. at 146-47. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 1366. 
 95. Id. 
2007]                    HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE   793 
 
                                                                                                                   
buffed a marriage and family counselor who refused to counsel ho-
mosexual patients about their relationships and who wanted her em-
ployer to excuse her from discussing subjects with patients that con-
flicted with her religion.96 Her employer contended it was unable to 
accommodate plaintiff because its counseling obligations did not ex-
clude certain problems and because it would be difficult to ascertain 
specific patient care topics in advance of a counseling session.97 The 
court noted that unlike many Title VII cases, plaintiff was seeking 
not merely to rearrange her schedule, but only “to perform those as-
pects of the position she found acceptable.”98 The court concluded the 
logistic and economic burdens in having other counselors assume a 
disproportionate workload or to be available to cover a session in case 
a problematic subject came up was an undue hardship.99   
 Courts have recognized that health care refusals impose burdens 
not only on employers, but also on patients. In Shelton v. University 
of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, discussed at the beginning of 
this Article, the plaintiff filed suit under Title VII, claiming the hos-
pital failed to accommodate her religious objections to emergency ob-
stetrical procedures she believed were tantamount to abortion.100 The 
court held that the hospital made a good faith attempt to find an ac-
ceptable accommodation, which was stymied by the nurse’s lack of 
cooperation.101 The Third Circuit voiced its concerns about refusal 
rights asserted during a medical emergency: 
 It would seem unremarkable that public protectors such as 
police and firefighters must be neutral in providing their 
services. We would include public health care providers 
among such public protectors. Although we do not interpret 
Title VII to require a presumption of undue burden, we be-
lieve public trust and confidence requires that a public hos-
pital’s health care practitioners—with professional ethical 
obligations to care for the sick and injured—will provide 
treatment in time of emergency.102
 Obviously disenchanted with what they believe is a minimal level 
of accommodation required of employers under Title VII or similar 
state laws, health care workers, politicians, and some commentators 
 
 96. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Serv., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 500. 
 99. Id. at 501. 
 100. 223 F.3d 220, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2000). The plaintiff also alleged her rights were vio-
lated under the New Jersey Conscience Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:65A-1 to -3 (West 
2000). The court held this claim was waived because it was not presented in the lower 
court. Id. at 228-29. 
 101. Id. at 228. 
 102. Id. 
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are seeking greater protection through new legislation.103 Professor 
Lynn Wardle, arguing that Title VII provides only limited safeguards 
for the rights of health care employees,104 has proposed a model stat-
ute that prevents employers from taking adverse action against any 
individual because of a refusal to “counsel, advise, . . . provide, per-
form, assist or participate directly or indirectly in providing or per-
forming health services that violate his or her religious or moral con-
victions.”105 The suggested statute also allows persons to be excluded 
from employment only where the services required are a necessary 
and substantial part of the person’s responsibilities and if the person’s 
conscience “cannot be reasonably accommodated by diligent effort.”106   
 Rather than occupy a middle ground where health care employees 
could have been given more security than afforded by Title VII, legis-
lators opted to eliminate the ability of employers to take any action 
against those who refuse to perform job-related duties. Under recent 
state refusal legislation, employers cannot assert that they will suffer 
a substantial economic or logistical hardship in accommodating a 
worker’s religious, moral, or ethical objection to providing health care 
services. Mississippi law specifically provides that employers may 
not use a defense of undue burden in any civil action brought for vio-
lation of its conscience protections.107 Legislators in Arkansas, Ala-
bama, South Carolina, Missouri, South Dakota, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and West Virginia tracked the language in the Mississippi 
statute in their proposals, abrogating a defense of undue hardship 
where the employee refuses to provide any health care service on 
grounds of conscience.108 Only Michigan and Texas gave some consid-
eration to the burden on the employer or coworkers.109   
 
 103. In addition to state proposals, there have been efforts in Congress to amend Title 
VII to require a heightened level of accommodation by employers. Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act of 2005, S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005) (defining 
undue hardship as an accommodation that would impose “significant difficulty or ex-
pense”). A number of commentators have criticized the de minimis accommodation stan-
dard under Title VII. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious Liberty, 33 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 21 (2001) (stating that “too little has been required of employers under Title 
VII”). Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protec-
tion of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
575, 609 (2000) (“Overall, the lower courts have interpreted reasonable accommodation in 
a narrow manner which, while in line with Supreme Court precedent, is at odds with con-
gressional intent.”).   
 104. Wardle, supra note 9, at 218. 
 105. Id. at 228, app. (A Proposal for Comprehensive Conscience Clause Legislation, 
Health Care Providers’ Rights to Conscience Protection Act). 
 106. Id. at 229. 
 107. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-11(1) (“It shall not be a defense to any claim arising out 
of the violation of this chapter that such violation was necessary to prevent additional burden or 
expense on any other health care provider, health care institution, individual or patient.”).   
 108. See supra notes 50, 51, 53-57, 59, 61. 
 109. Under the Michigan bill, an employer may terminate a health care provider if the 
provider objects to a service that constitutes more than ten percent of the provider’s daily 
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 Thus, in most states where broad conscience clauses are being 
considered, health care employers would be hindered not only in hir-
ing or firing an employee, but also in their efforts to accommodate an 
employee’s religious, moral, or ethical practices regardless of the cost 
or inconvenience to the employer. Reasonable accommodation “fur-
thers the interests of tolerance on the part of both the employee and 
the employer”110 and, it can be argued, the interests of other employees 
and patients who may be seriously affected by the employee’s beliefs. 
The absolute accommodation of an employee’s religious or personal con-
duct may threaten the safety and health of patients, cause significant 
hardship on the employer’s business, and undermine the workplace.  
C.   Nonreligious Objections 
 Conscience is defined broadly under Mississippi’s refusal law and 
recent state proposals following its path.111 In addition to religious 
grounds for objection, providers may decline to participate in health 
care services on moral or ethical grounds.112 The Mississippi statute 
does not restrict moral or ethical principles to theist beliefs or even to 
those beliefs “held with the strength of traditional religious convic-
tions.”113 By defining conscience in this manner, legislators may have 
effectively insulated these broad refusal laws from Establishment 
Clause challenge,114 but in so doing have opened the door for protec-
tion of a vast array of purely secular, personal beliefs. 
 On the surface, this does not seem objectionable: why shouldn’t 
professionals be able to deny some aspects of treatment based on 
personal, nonreligious convictions? A partial answer is that there are 
definitional difficulties and practical implications associated with the 
terms “moral” or “ethical.” This is not the place to address the many 
competing ethical frameworks and perspectives in medicine, but 
rather to raise questions about the reach of these laws. The funda-
 
or weekly hours of duty. See H.B. 4660, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3(i), 9(3) (Mich. 2007), 
available at http://legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-
HIB-4660.pdf. The Texas proposal had a similar termination provision, except that an em-
ployee could be terminated only if the health care service involved fifty percent or more of 
the provider’s duties. See S.B. 1016, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 172.158 (Tex. 2005), available 
at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/SB01016I.pdf.  
 110. Jamar, supra note 73, at 792.  
 111. There are two notable exceptions. The Illinois statute defines conscience narrowly: 
“ ‘Conscience’ means a sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and 
relation to God, or which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the life of its 
possessor parallel to that filled by God among adherents to religious faiths . . . .” 745 
ILL. STAT. ANN.§ 70/3(e). The Washington state proposal adopted the same definition. 
See H.B. 1654, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(5) (Wash. 2005), available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1654.pdf.  
 112. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h) (defining conscience as “the religious, moral, or ethical 
principles held by a health care provider, the health care institution, or health care payer”).  
 113. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970).  
 114. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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mental question is whether legislators intend to endorse objections to 
care based on ethics arising not only out of religious traditions or 
deeply held moral principles, but also those commonly associated 
with philosophical principles, professional consensus, or simply per-
sonal opinions of what is right and wrong. Without further clarifica-
tion by legislators or interpretation by the courts, this expansive pro-
vision could result in the denial of almost any treatment for reasons 
peculiar to the health care professional or facility. 
 Although religion has been singled out for special treatment un-
der the First Amendment, similar preferences have not, and consti-
tutionally need not, be made for personal, philosophical, or political 
objections to assisting or participating in controversial services.115 
Jurists and scholars have grappled with the difficulty of distinguish-
ing between religious and other beliefs,116 but “[a] purely rational, 
philosophical ethical system, regardless of how moral and central to 
a person’s life would appear not to meet the definition”117 of religion 
under the Free Exercise Clause.  
 Under Title VII, “religion” has been broadly construed, with both 
courts and the EEOC recognizing observances or beliefs that would 
not be considered traditionally religious.118 The EEOC defines reli-
gious practice under Title VII to embrace “all moral or ethical beliefs 
 
 115. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) 
(“Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its 
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 215 (1972) (“[T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be 
rooted in religious belief.”). Professor Stanley Ingber notes that the framers of the Consti-
tution recognized the difference between religion and conscience and chose not to include a 
right of conscience in the First Amendment. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed 
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 277 (1989); see also Michael W. 
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) (“The 
very text of the Constitution ‘singles out’ governmental acts respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the exercise of religion for special protections that are not accorded 
to any aspect of human life.”). 
 116. The Supreme Court has not clarified what beliefs qualify as religious for purposes 
of Constitutional protection. The Court took a broad view of religion under the conscien-
tious objector statute. See Welsh, 398 U.S at 339-40 (1970) (“What is necessary . . . for a 
registrant’s conscientious objection to all war to be ‘religious’ . . . is that this opposition to 
war stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and 
wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convic-
tions.”). In Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216, the Court narrowed its interpretation of religious belief, 
stating that philosophical and personal beliefs are not encompassed by the Religion 
Clauses. See also Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (stating 
that “purely secular views” do not qualify as religious beliefs). For far more in-depth dis-
cussion of the issue than this Article can provide, see Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the 
Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 581 (1995); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional 
Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Ingber, supra note 115.  
 117. Jamar, supra note 73, at 751 (discussing the Supreme Court’s tests of religion). 
 118. See generally Donna D. Page, Comment, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Reli-
gious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 363 (2005).  
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as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the 
strength of traditional religious views.”119 Nevertheless, under Title 
VII, courts have generally “eschewed equating ethics with religion”120 
and refused to afford legal protection to personal preferences not as-
sociated with some religious, albeit nontraditional, tenet.121   
 Few courts have confronted purely secular, ethical objections to 
health care. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that a research physician could not refuse to 
work on loperamide, a drug for diarrhea being developed by her em-
ployer.122 The physician was opposed to the drug because it contained 
saccharin and she believed her work on the drug violated the Hippo-
cratic Oath.123 Noting the personal nature of the doctor’s opposition, 
the court observed:  
 Chaos would result if a single doctor engaged in research 
were allowed to determine, according to his or her individual 
conscience, whether a project should continue. . . . An em-
ployee does not have a right to continued employment when 
he or she refuses to conduct research simply because it 
would contravene his or her personal morals. An employee at 
will who refuses to work for an employer in answer to a call 
of conscience should recognize that other employees and 
their employer might heed a different call.124
 Invoking the Illinois conscience act, a nurse contended she was 
fired in retaliation for refusing to evict a bedridden patient.125 The 
court held the statute did not protect the nurse because her concerns 
were ethical and not “sincerely held moral convictions . . . arising 
from what are traditionally characterized as religious beliefs.”126 
Similarly, a nurse who refused to dialyze a terminally ill person be-
cause she believed the treatment to be medically futile and person-
ally wrong was not allowed to use nursing ethics as a defense to her 
 
 119. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2005) (adopting the Supreme Court’s definition of religion in 
conscientious objector cases). 
 120. Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 
517 (1999). 
 121. See Edwards v. Sch. Bd., 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980), vacated in part 
on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (“A religious belief excludes mere personal 
preference grounded upon a non-theological basis, such as personal choice deduced from 
economic or social ideology.”); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim because his “personal religious creed” that cat food 
contributed to his well-being did not qualify for protection as a religion).  
 122. 417 A.2d 505, 513 (N.J. 1980). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 514. 
 125. Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).  
 126. Id. at 1190. As discussed previously, the Illinois statute confines conscience to re-
ligious objections. See supra note 111.  
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employment action.127 The court accepted the hospital’s argument 
that “[i]t would be a virtual impossibility to administer a hospital if 
each nurse or member of the administration staff refused to carry out 
his or her duties based upon a personal private belief concerning the 
right to live.”128
 Most conscience clauses also protect institutional conscience.129 
Since Roe, states have allowed both private and public facilities to re-
fuse to provide abortions.130 Despite this broad right of refusal, some 
courts have been reluctant to recognize a secular institution’s consci-
entious objection. A few years after Roe, the Eighth Circuit held that 
Minnesota’s conscience clause allowing hospitals to refuse to perform 
abortions did not apply to public hospitals,131 and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court concluded that the state’s refusal clause did not pro-
tect nonsectarian, non-profit hospitals.132 More recently, the Alaska 
Supreme Court held that a non-profit hospital, which was not relig-
iously operated or affiliated, was a quasi-public entity and, under the 
Alaska Constitution, could not prohibit elective abortions even 
though it had a “sincere moral belief” that abortion was wrong.133    
 A state may choose, of course, to honor personal moral codes or 
secular ethical reasons for denying care. Many states allow health 
care providers to refuse on grounds of professional conscience to par-
ticipate in abortions134 or the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment.135 But these statutes are narrowly tailored and reflect the deep 
divisions in society over the morality of these actions. In the latest 
conscience clauses, the confluence of the ability to deny any health 
care service, the expansive grounds for refusal, and the resulting to-
tal immunity raises some disturbing questions. Ethical beliefs essen-
 
 127. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 128. Id. 
 129. For example, the Church Amendment allows hospitals to refuse to offer abortions 
and sterilizations. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000).  
 130. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 25.  
 131. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976). Minnesota Law states 
that “[n]o person and no hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discrimi-
nated against in any manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or sub-
mit to an abortion for any reason.” MINN. STAT. § 145.414(a) (2005). 
 132. Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 366 A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1976). It is important to 
note that these cases involved interpretation of state law. They do not grant individuals a 
federal constitutional right of access. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 133. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972 (Alaska 1997) 
(finding the state’s conscience clause unconstitutional as applied to a quasi-public hospi-
tal). Alaska’s conscience clause states: “Nothing in this section requires a hospital or per-
son to participate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable for refusing to partici-
pate in an abortion under this section.” ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (2004).   
 134. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician’s 
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1275-76 (1993) (stating that most states 
allow individuals to refuse to participate in an abortion for any reason). 
 135. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.  
2007]                    HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE   799 
 
                                                                                                                   
tial to moral or religious traditions are entitled to deference. But 
what do we make of a pharmacist who refuses to fill a prescription 
for Ritalin?136 Will society countenance a denial of expensive, “futile” 
treatment over a patient’s or family’s objection because the profes-
sional has strongly held convictions about the just allocation of 
health care resources?137 If any belief system is accepted, will “every 
citizen . . . become a law unto himself?”138  
 Further, under these conscience laws, any nonsectarian hospital 
or health care payer could refuse to provide services without fear of a 
lawsuit as long as it referenced the ethical reasons for its refusal in 
its incorporation documents, mission statement or other docu-
ments.139 Under the Mississippi and Illinois statutes, public hospitals 
are also entitled to invoke a right of conscience.140 It is not clear what 
“conscience” a public entity may have, and, even from a practical per-
spective, the ability of these institutions to refuse any health care 
service may mean a disruption of essential services, particularly for 
those for whom a public hospital is a last resort.141 A more measured 
statute would, at a minimum, restrict exemptions to denominational 
institutions. Legislators should heed Chief Justice Burger’s warning 
in Wisconsin v. Yoder: “[T]he very concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters 
of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”142
IV.   RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE AND THE CONFLICT WITH PROFESSIONAL 
DUTIES 
 Although the current debate primarily involves family planning 
and reproductive issues, these broad conscience clauses will inevita-
bly lead to more conflicts between patient care and the beliefs of 
 
 136. See Tresa Baldas, Fighting Refusal to Treat, “Conscience” Clauses Hit the Courts, 
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 7, 2005, at 1 (reporting that a Dallas pharmacist refused to fill a mother’s 
prescription for her son’s Ritalin).  
 137. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the 
Critically Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 23, 75 (1993) (“There is great danger in confusing the issues 
of physiologically futile treatment and allocation of scarce health care resources. The need 
for reallocation of health care resources may be an appropriate reason for society to con-
sider whether it is willing to pay for futile treatment for a dying patient but it is not a cri-
terion by which a physician may independently determine that particular treatments for a 
dying patient are futile.”). 
 138. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
 139. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h) (“For purposes of this chapter a health care insti-
tution or health care payer’s conscience shall be determined by reference to its existing or 
proposed religious, moral or ethical guidelines, mission statement, constitution, bylaws, ar-
ticles of incorporation, regulations or other relevant documents.”).  
 140. § 41-107-3(c).  
 141. Of course, a public hospital may limit its services for financial or other reasons as 
deemed appropriate by the governing authorities. Patients do not have a general right to 
health care. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 142. 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
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health care providers. Does respecting conscience mean that, based 
on religious or ethical teachings, physicians or entities may conscien-
tiously refuse to provide or even mention the availability of common 
childhood vaccines, such as rubella or varicella (chicken pox), be-
cause the cell lines were originally developed from aborted fetal tis-
sue?143 Or that a facility may refuse not only to honor a terminally ill 
person’s request to have a feeding tube removed, but also refuse to 
assist in the transfer of the patient to another caregiver? Or that a 
physician may neglect to inform an HIV-infected patient of the need 
to use latex condoms to prevent viral transmission?144 Or that a 
pharmacist may decline to refill a prescription for an AIDS drug be-
cause the person practices an “immoral” life style? Unless otherwise 
precluded by state or federal law,145 under the expansive conscience 
clauses being considered, health care professionals who refuse such 
services on moral grounds would be immune from accountability to 
their patients or their licensing boards. In preserving an individual 
health care provider’s right to make moral and ethical choices, such 
legislation allows the professional to violate another kind of ethic: 
the duty to the patient.  
 
 143. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM, 
CONCERNS ABOUT VACCINE CONTAMINATION, http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/concerns/ 
gen/contamination.htm (stating that rubella and varicella vaccines are made from human 
cell lines, some of which originated from aborted fetal tissue obtained in the 1960s). In 
June 2005, the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy for Life stated that fetal tissue vaccines 
should be used only where there is a “significant risk to health” and urged doctors and 
families to use conscientious objection, if necessary, to vaccines produced from human 
fetal tissue. Pontifical Academy for Life, Moral Reflections On Vaccines Prepared from 
Cells Derived from Aborted Human Foetuses (June 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.academiavita.org/template.jsp?sez=Documenti&pag=testo/vacc/vacc&lang=english. 
 144. Although the issue is apparently being revisited, the Catholic Church views the 
use of condoms, even as a prophylactic against disease, as a moral wrong because they pre-
vent conception. See Ian Fisher, Ideals Collide as Vatican Rethinks Condom Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A1. A bill introduced in the New York Assembly in 2006 would have 
given health care providers the right to refuse to assist, refer, or provide information about 
the use of condoms to prevent disease. See A.B. 9536, State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2006). This bill conflicted with guidelines published by the New York Department of 
Health, which urge all primary care physicians to advise HIV-infected patients to use con-
doms to prevent the spread of disease. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH AIDS INST., PRIMARY 
CARE APPROACH TO THE HIV-INFECTED INDIVIDUAL 16 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.hivguidelines.org/GuideLine.aspx?pageID=257&guideLineID=13.  
 145. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination 
against a person because of a disability, which includes HIV or AIDS. Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). However, neither the ADA nor other federal law addresses dis-
crimination due to sexual orientation. Some states bar conscientious refusals to treat based 
on sexual orientation. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 (2005) (prohibiting health care pro-
viders from refusing services based on race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, 
creed, or sexual orientation). Other state proposals conspicuously omit sexual orientation 
from the list of prohibited grounds for refusal to treat. See, e.g., Arkansas Health Care 
Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 1141, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005), available 
at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/sb1141.pdf (providing that a 
health care provider may not assert a conscientious objection based on a patient’s race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability).   
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 A professional’s responsibilities to patients are set out in law and 
in ethical and professional guidelines. Of paramount consideration is 
the patient’s right to self-determination. While generally affirming a 
physician’s privilege to decline to participate in morally objectionable 
treatment, Beauchamp and Childers, in their classic text Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics, draw the line at conscientious objection where 
the service is part of a physician’s general responsibilities and the 
patient’s right to self-determination is impaired.146 “A patient’s right 
of autonomy should not be purchased at the price of the physician’s 
parallel right. These observations hold for other health professionals 
as well.”147 Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, now serving as chairman of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, observes that while “[t]he moral 
values of religious persons transcend the ‘values’ of the profession,” a 
provider’s conscience claim is not superior to the patient’s own value 
system.148 “Both the physician and the patient as human beings are 
entitled to respect for their personal autonomy. Neither one is em-
powered to override the other. The protection of freedom of con-
science is owed to both.”149
 Legal standards recognize that abandonment of the patient; 
breaches of fiduciary duty, including failure to provide information 
necessary for the patient to make an informed choice; and failure to 
disclose conflicts pertinent to the treatment relationship may serve 
as grounds for a malpractice claim. To a certain extent, malpractice 
claims are punishment for a breach of trust the patient places in the 
health care provider.150 To safeguard the well-being of the public, li-
censing authorities may review the practice of those who fail to fol-
low professional guidelines, even where no harm to a particular pa-
tient occurs.151 Conscience clauses may severely restrict the ability of 
patients and regulators to seek redress for unprofessional conduct.  
A.   The Duty to Provide Care 
 Although the controversy over conscience clauses has been framed 
as a dispute between patients’ right to treatment (primarily repro-
ductive services) and health care providers’ right to deny care,152 ac-
cess to health care in the United States is not generally a “right.” At 
 
 146. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
38 (5th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 241. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 491 (2002). 
 151. See, e.g., In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1990) (“There is no requirement, 
however, that every action taken by the Board specifically identify or address a particular 
injury or danger to any individual or to the public.”).  
 152. See Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y 139, 153-57 (2006); White, supra note 9, at 1748.    
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common law, unless there is a consensual relationship between pro-
vider and patient, there is no legal duty to render treatment.153 Pro-
fessional codes also support a health care provider’s right to decline a 
potential patient for personal or moral reasons.154 And while courts 
have afforded individuals the right to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernment interference into private health matters such as abortion or 
the use of contraceptives, there is no federal constitutional right of 
access to these (or any other) health care services.155 In Doe v. Bolton, 
decided the same day as Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that 
conscience laws, when narrowly tailored, do not conflict with a pa-
tient’s constitutional reproductive rights.156 In striking down portions 
of a Georgia abortion statute, the Court wrote: 
And the hospital itself is otherwise fully protected. Under [Georgia 
law] the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. . . . 
Further a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, 
for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abortion 
procedure. These provisions obviously are in the statute in order to 
afford appropriate protection to the individual and to the denomi-
national hospital.157
 The right to refuse or limit services to those not already in a rela-
tionship with the health care provider is not unlimited, however. The 
 
 153. The absence of an obligation to provide health care services is consistent with the 
common law rule that, absent a special relationship, no person, even a health care profes-
sional, has a duty to come to the aid of a person in distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314 (1965); see also St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1995) (concluding 
that a physician may decline to create a physician-patient relationship); Wilmington Gen. 
Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. 1961) (stating rule that a private hospital has no 
common law duty to accept every patient who desires services).  
 154. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, Opinion 
10.05(3)(c) (2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8327.html (stat-
ing that physicians, subject to certain exceptions, may a decline a patient when treatment 
sought “is incompatible with the physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs”).  
 155. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (holding that the 
due process clause does not confer a right to governmental assistance in procuring an abor-
tion); Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (stating that while government may not 
interfere with a woman’s freedom of choice, it need not remove obstacles to the exercise of 
that right); Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 
1987) (concluding that there is no general constitutional right to essential medical care and 
services). The only exception to this principle may be the right to at least minimal care 
guaranteed prisoners and others involuntarily confined. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982) (involuntarily committed mentally retarded individuals); Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In addition, some state constitutions may require the provision of 
certain health care services. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
 156. 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-02 (1991) 
(holding that a prohibition on counseling or referral for abortion as a part of family plan-
ning services under Title X does not violate a women’s right to receive the full range of 
medical options).  
 157. Doe, 410 U.S. at 197-98; see also Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 78 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (holding that a Catholic hospital was not acting as a state actor under color of 
law when it denied a woman a tubal ligation despite the fact that it was the only hospital 
in the city where she could secure a sterilization).  
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common law “no duty” exception may be altered by contract, statute, 
or regulation. For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA) requires hospitals that participate in the Medi-
care program to screen and, if an emergency condition is present, to 
stabilize persons who come to hospital emergency rooms prior to 
their discharge or transfer.158 Federal statutes also govern refusals to 
treat based on race, religion, age, gender, or disability.159 State laws 
may provide protection to other categories of persons.160 Tax-exempt 
facilities are required to provide some level of charitable care to indi-
gent patients to justify their preferred status under federal and state 
tax laws.161  
 Absent state or federal regulation, however, a health care profes-
sional is free to define the parameters of his or her practice and may 
refuse to provide services to prospective patients.162 Facilities, al-
though subject to more regulatory standards, are generally not re-
quired to provide specific treatments. Thus, an obstetrician-
gynecologist may decline to treat a woman who seeks an abortion, a 
 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). Some courts have held that even under the common 
law, a private hospital operating an emergency room could not refuse services to patients 
who relied on the custom of the hospital to render aid to those in an “unmistakable” emer-
gency condition. Manlove, 174 A.2d. at 140; see also Williams v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall 
County, 168 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1969) (holding that public hospitals have a duty to treat pa-
tients in need of emergency treatment). 
 159. See, e.g., Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, color, or national origin by institu-
tions receiving federal financial assistance); Title III of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000b (2000) (banning discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin in public facilities); Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2000) 
(barring discrimination on the basis of age in programs receiving federal financial assis-
tance); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000) (pro-
hibiting sex discrimination by certain programs receiving federal financial assistance); 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (proscribing discrimination against persons who 
are disabled).  
 160. See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2006) (prohibiting 
discrimination by all business establishments on grounds of sex, race, color, religion, an-
cestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation). 
“Business establishment” includes a physician’s practice. Washington v. Blampin, 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 235, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).  
 161. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). Most states also require health facilities to 
provide charitable care to qualify for exemption from state and local taxes. See, e.g., Utah 
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 277-78 (Utah 1985) (holding that 
hospitals were not entitled to ad valorem property tax exemption because they did not pro-
vide a sufficient charitable benefit).  
 162. Even in light of statutes prohibiting discrimination, a provider is free to refuse to 
offer a service as long as the refusal is nondiscriminatory and directed to all persons. See 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91-92 (2004) (stating 
that Catholic Charities could have avoided a conflict with state mandate to provide contra-
ceptive coverage by not offering prescription coverage to anyone).  
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private hospital may refuse to admit patients for elective steriliza-
tions, and a pharmacy may refuse to stock contraceptives.163  
 Assuming that a professional relationship exists, however, certain 
obligations are created. Health professionals owe duties to their pa-
tients according to accepted standards of care and, in the absence of 
a conscience clause, cannot simply refuse to treat or counsel their pa-
tients without exposure to liability for abandonment, malpractice 
suits, or disciplinary action.  
B.   Duty of a Pharmacist to Dispense Medication 
 The law governing the establishment of the traditional patient-
provider relationship and the duties attendant to that relationship is 
well established. Physicians and hospitals have obligations to those 
with whom they enter consensual relationships. The duty of pharma-
cists to their customers is not as clear. Although a few states have 
statutes or regulations requiring pharmacists to fill all lawful pre-
scriptions,164 most courts have not addressed this issue.  
 A recent case demonstrates that courts will probably apply the 
common law “no duty” rule to pharmacists who do not have a prior 
relationship with a customer. In Chiney v. American Drug Stores, 
Inc., a customer who was suffering from an acute asthmatic attack 
and had run out of Albuterol requested a pharmacist either to pro-
vide Albuterol or verify with her doctor or hospital that she was “en-
titled to” the drug.165 Because she did not have a prescription, the 
pharmacist refused her request, and she was forced to travel by am-
bulance to a hospital for treatment.166 Although the plaintiff suffered 
damage to her breathing, the court dismissed her negligence claim 
because the pharmacist had no legal duty to a potential customer in 
the absence of a valid prescription drug order.167  
 For the court in Chiney, the key issues were the failure of the cus-
tomer to present a valid prescription and the fact that there was no 
preexisting relationship.168 Under other circumstances, the result 
may have been different. If, for example, the plaintiff had previous 
prescriptions for Albuterol filled at the pharmacy, a relationship 
might have existed sufficient to impose a duty on the pharmacist to 
call the physician to authorize a refill. Once treatment (or the dis-
pensing of medication) has begun, a health care provider may not 
 
 163. For example, until 2006, Wal-Mart refused to sell emergency contraceptives. See 
infra note 238 and accompanying text.   
 164. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733(a), -(b)(3) (West 2006); ILL. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2005). 
 165. 21 S.W.3d 14, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 166. Id. at 16. 
 167. Id. at 18. 
 168. Id.  
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terminate treatment or abandon a patient without either proper no-
tice of withdrawal from the relationship or transfer of care.169   
 Where there is no preexisting relationship, a duty to fill a pre-
scription could arise in several ways. First, it could be argued that by 
having a monopoly on the distribution of prescription drugs and hold-
ing itself out to the public, the pharmacy assumes a duty to fill all 
lawful prescriptions. It is doubtful, however, that simply being in 
business is sufficient to establish a legal obligation to provide medi-
cations to anyone who presents a prescription. The law does not gen-
erally impose a duty to provide services to all persons who seek those 
services or, by extension, to carry all medications in inventory.170   
 A duty to the patient may also arise by virtue of a third-party re-
lationship on which the patient relies for services. Courts have been 
willing to impose a duty to treat when the provider has entered a 
contract with a hospital or managed care organization that has 
agreed to provide services to the patient.171 If the provider refuses to 
provide services to an enrolled patient, the patient may appropriately 
allege a violation of the duty to provide care. Similarly, a pharmacy 
may contract with a managed care organization or other third party 
to fill enrolled patients’ prescriptions, thereby giving rise to a duty to 
dispense medications.172
 If a duty to dispense exists, the question remains whether it is 
good policy for pharmacists to be able to refuse to fill or transfer pre-
scriptions based on their personal beliefs. Pharmacists often liken 
their roles to physicians, who have the right under their professional 
codes to opt out of procedures they find morally objectionable.173 Al-
 
 169. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text; see also France v. State, 506 
N.Y.S.2d 254, (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986) (finding pharmacist negligent for failing to refill pris-
oner’s prescription). The France case is unique, and may have little general applicability, 
because prisoners are not free to take their prescriptions to another pharmacist. 
 170. See, e.g., Walling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 
(stating the general rule that a private hospital may refuse to accept a patient for elective 
care for any (nondiscriminatory) reason). Cf. Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 
457 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the ADA does not require public accommodations to offer 
certain goods, but only to guarantee nondiscriminatory access to goods actually offered). 
 171. See Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that HMO 
subscriber is a third-party beneficiary of HMO’s contracts and physician could not deny ex-
istence of physician-patient relationship). 
 172. In August 2005, the city of Austin, Texas, required Walgreens, the pharmaceutical 
contractor for patients enrolled in its medical assistance program, to ensure that all pre-
scriptions, including contraceptives, are filled without discrimination or delay if an indi-
vidual pharmacist refuses to do so because of personal beliefs. Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Found., Daily Women’s Health Policy Report, Contraception & Family Planning: Austin, 
Texas, City Council Passes Measure to Require Walgreens to Fill Prescriptions, Including 
EC, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=32136 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2007). 
 173. See Hearing on Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies Before the H. Small 
B.C., 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, American Pharmacists 
Association) (“Pharmacists, like physicians and nurses, should not be forced to participate 
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though pharmacists are part of the health care team, there are rea-
sons to question this analogy. Pharmacists do not occupy the same 
role that physicians have with their patients.174 Most pharmacists 
are employed by for-profit retail establishments that sell a product to 
the public. Although individual pharmacists are licensed profession-
als who owe a duty of care to patients, their primary responsibilities 
lie in using their professional judgment to ensure that the prescrip-
tion presented by the patient is properly filled and the medication 
order is not unlawful, erroneous, unauthorized, or unsafe.175 Phar-
macists do not take a medical history, examine, or diagnose the pa-
tient or discuss the indications for the medication with the patient.176 
Most jurisdictions have not imposed on the pharmacist even a com-
mon law duty to warn the patient of a medication’s adverse effects; 
that duty remains with the physician.177 Moreover, pharmacists gen-
erally lack the information necessary to assess the reasons why a 
drug has been prescribed to the patient.178 A pharmacist cannot dis-
cern the patient’s condition by looking solely at a prescription. For 
example, many women take contraceptives for medical conditions 
unrelated to the prevention of pregnancy.179   
 Professional groups have also raised concerns about pharmacists’ 
refusals to fill valid prescriptions. In 2005, the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) adopted a policy encouraging state legislation to 
 
in procedures to which they have moral objections.”), available at 
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=3582&TEMPLA
TE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. 
 174. In a recent article, the authors argue that pharmacists’ responsibilities are con-
strained by and dependent on the medical profession, and “(u)nlike physicians, pharma-
cists do not exercise full autonomous control and authority over their area of expertise.” L. 
Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, Refusals by Pharmacists to Dispense Emergency Contracep-
tion: A Critique, 107 J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1148, 1148 (2006). 
 175. See generally David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Re-
sponsibilities of Pharmacists: Should “Can” Imply “Ought”?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439 (1996). 
 176. Wall & Brown, supra note 174, at 1149. 
 177. See Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that a majority of courts have not imposed a general duty to warn where the pre-
scription is valid on its face); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055-56 
(Wash. 1989) (en banc) (“The pharmacist does not . . . have a duty to question a judgment 
made by the physician as to the propriety of a prescription or to warn customers of the 
hazardous side effects associated with a drug, either orally or by way of the manufacturer’s 
package insert.”). But see Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 
1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that whether there is breach of a duty to warn by a 
pharmacist is a question of fact). 
 178. See Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May 
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 2008, 2010 (2004); see also McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053 (“[W]ithout benefit of a patient’s 
medical history, the pharmacist is not qualified to determine the propriety of a particular 
drug regimen.”). 
 179. Common conditions for which contraceptives are prescribed include abnormal 
menses, endometriosis, and acne. See Jeffrey T. Jensen & Leon Speroff, Health Benefits of 
Oral Contraceptives, 27 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. CLINICS N. AM., 705, 717 (2000). 
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preserve a patient’s ability to acquire prescription drugs.180 While 
supporting the right of pharmacists to decline on moral grounds to 
provide medications for services such abortion or contraception, the 
American College of Clinical Pharmacy recognizes the ethical re-
sponsibility to refer patients to another pharmacist or health care 
provider so that patients have access to medications in an “effective, 
professional, timely, confidential, and nonjudgmental manner.”181  
 The drawbacks to affording pharmacists a right to refuse selec-
tively to dispense medication without accountability for unprofes-
sional conduct can be seen in the widely publicized Noesen case.182 
Amanda Renz requested a refill of an oral contraceptive at a Kmart 
Pharmacy where her prescription was on file.183 Neil Noesen, the 
only pharmacist on duty, asked Renz if she intended to use the medi-
cation for contraception, and when she replied affirmatively, Noesen 
told her he would not refill the prescription because of his religious 
objection.184 Renz needed to begin the first dose of the contraceptive 
that day and asked Noesen where she could go to have the prescrip-
tion filled.185 Noesen refused to provide this information because he 
did not want to help her obtain contraceptives.186 After her encounter 
with Noesen, Renz went to a nearby Wal-Mart to attempt to have her 
prescription filled. The Wal-Mart pharmacist was willing to dispense 
the drug and called Noesen to request transfer of Renz’s prescription.187 
Noesen refused to provide the information necessary for the transfer.188  
 In April 2005, the Wisconsin State Pharmacy Board reprimanded 
Noesen for his unprofessional conduct in failing to inform Renz of her 
options to obtain the medication and in refusing to transfer the pre-
 
 180. AM. MED. ASS’N, PRESERVING PATIENTS’ ABILITY TO HAVE LEGALLY VALID 
PRESCRIPTIONS FILLED, POLICY D-120.975, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/DIR/D-120.975.HTM&s_t= 
D.120.975&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth
=1& (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).  
 181. Am. Coll. of Clinical Pharmacy, Position Statement, Prerogative of a Pharmacist 
to Decline to Provide Professional Services Based on Conscience (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.accp.com/position/pos31_200508.pdf; see also AM. PHARM. ASS’N, 2004 ACTION 
OF THE APHA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=About_APhA1&templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=225 (supporting the establishment of sys-
tems to ensure patient’s access to medication while recognizing pharmacist’s right of 
conscientious refusal). 
 182. In re Noesen, No. LS0310091PHM (State of Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 
13, 2005), available at http://drl.wi.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. 
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scription to another pharmacist.189 The issue before the board was 
not about Noesen’s right to exercise his beliefs, but “about following 
professional standards in the exercise of one’s conscience.”190 The 
Board’s decision was upheld on appeal to the county circuit court.191 
Had this action occurred in Mississippi after 2004, a pharmacist in 
similar circumstances could not have been disciplined because the 
statute provides that no health care provider, including a pharmacist, 
can be administratively liable for refusing to participate in a health care 
service, including patient referral, for reasons of conscience.192  
 By offering complete immunity to pharmacists who object to fill-
ing or transferring prescriptions, states are not only limiting the pre-
rogatives of state disciplinary boards, but also conferring a benefit on 
pharmacists at the expense of the pharmacy or hospital that employs 
them. Under state conscience clauses, the owner of the pharmacy 
would be unable to fire (or refuse to hire) a pharmacist who objects to 
a job-related function. As an employee, a pharmacist has a right un-
der Title VII or comparable state law to request reasonable accom-
modation of his moral beliefs, but no right to insist on job security 
where his or her conduct interferes with essential duties and the em-
ployee is unwilling to cooperate with the employer in resolving the 
dispute.193 For instance, if the pharmacy has two pharmacists on 
duty at all times, only one of whom has an objection to dispensing 
contraceptives, it is possible to accommodate the employee. But if it 
is necessary to hire another nonobjecting pharmacist or schedule a 
pharmacist already on staff to work additional hours alongside the ob-
jecting pharmacist, accommodating the employee’s conduct may consti-
tute an excessive burden on employers and nonobjecting pharmacists.194  
 States should be wary of allowing individual pharmacists a blan-
ket exemption to refuse to dispense medication or transfer a pre-
 
 189. Id. Noesen was ordered to pay $20,000 to cover the costs of the proceedings and to 
complete at least six hours of continuing education in pharmacy practice ethics. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Noesen v. Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing Pharmacy Examining Bd., Case 
No. 05CV212 (Cir. Ct. Wis. Feb. 3, 2006). This case, however, is not the end of the Noesen 
story. In 2006, Noesen brought an unrelated claim in federal court asserting he was unlaw-
fully terminated by a Wal-Mart pharmacy in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 
1985. Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., No. 06-C-071-S, 2006 WL 1529664 (W.D. Wis. 
June 1, 2006). Noesen alleged he was fired because “he refused to distribute contraceptives 
and that defendants violated his First Amendment rights.” Id. at *1. The court dismissed 
the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. Id. at *3. As to the Title VII claim, the court stated: “It is un-
disputed that plaintiff was not meeting the legitimate expectations of either Wal-Mart or 
MSN. He was placing customers [who sought to fill birth control prescriptions] on hold in-
definitely and not assisting in-store customers without notifying another pharmacist.” Id. at 
*4.  Defendants were granted summary judgment on the Title VII claim. Id. The trial court’s 
ruling was affirmed on appeal, No. 06-2831, 2007 WL 1302118 (7th Cir. May 2, 2007). 
 192. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a) to 5(a) (2006). 
 193. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 84 and 93 and accompanying text. 
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scription based on ethical or moral reasons. Rather, a balance should 
be struck by accommodating pharmacists’ objections where feasible, 
but rejecting the unfettered right to obstruct the delivery to patients 
of lawfully prescribed medications.195
C.   Duty to Disclose Information Relevant to the Treatment 
Relationship 
 One of the most striking transformations in health care during 
the last fifty years is the concept that patients have a right to infor-
mation that will enable them to participate in medical decisions. The 
duty to disclose may arise out of the fiducial responsibilities of the 
physician-patient relationship, the duty to provide informed consent, 
or general negligence standards. Conscience laws that allow physi-
cians to refuse to counsel or advise patients threaten this right of 
self-determination.196  
1.   The Fiduciary Relationship 
 The relationship between physician and patient is one of trust and 
confidence and has been described as a fiduciary relationship.197 Al-
though there are few cases that hold physicians accountable as fidu-
ciaries, the duty of fidelity is both an ethical ideal and a legal under-
pinning in informed consent, breach of confidentiality, and conflict of 
interest cases.198 The essence of the fiduciary relationship is trust.199 
As one court has stated, “[t]he patient’s reliance upon the physician 
is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations be-
yond those associated with arms length transactions.”200 In a physi-
 
 195. See Cantor & Baum, supra note 178, at 2011-12 (setting out ways in which an ac-
commodation between the needs of the patient and a pharmacist’s moral objection can be 
achieved); see also MacLean, supra note 173 (stating that common systems used to accom-
modate a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense include staffing the pharmacy with a nonobject-
ing pharmacist or referring a new prescription or transferring a refill prescription to dif-
ferent pharmacy). 
 196. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(f) (participating in medical care includes, among 
other things, to “counsel” or “advise”). The Michigan proposal is a notable exception as it 
does not relieve a provider from any duties that exist to inform a patient of the prognosis 
or risk of receiving or foregoing treatment, including the availability of a health care ser-
vice to which the provider objects. H.B. 4660, § 9(2), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 
2007) available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/ 
House/pdf/2007-HIB-4660.pdf. 
 197. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); Lockett v. 
Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 
146, at 312.   
 198. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties 
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 247-48 (1995).  
 199. See Hall, supra note 150, at 470 (“Trust is the core, defining characteristic of 
the doctor-patient relationship—the ‘glue’ that holds the relationship together and 
makes it possible.”). 
 200. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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cian-patient relationship, trust encompasses the realization of two 
factors: the professional’s acquisition of power and control over a 
vulnerable patient and the patient’s utter dependence on the physi-
cian for competent and responsible medical care.201
 The essence of the fiduciary duty requires medical professionals to 
put their patients’ interests ahead of all others, including their 
own.202 The AMA recognizes fidelity to patients as a fundamental 
ethical principle: “The relationship between patient and physician is 
based on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to 
place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest and above obli-
gations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ wel-
fare.”203 The ethics manual of the American College of Physicians 
provides that a “physician’s primary commitment must always be to 
the patient’s welfare and best interests.”204 Fiduciary relationships 
exact loyalty from professionals by curbing practices such as undue 
influence or coercion over patients, abuse of the patient’s trust, 
breach of confidences, and abandonment.205
2.   Duty to Provide Informed Consent 
 The legal and ethical duties of a physician to disclose the risks 
and benefits of treatment and the alternatives to treatment are well 
recognized. Beginning with several notable cases in the 1970s, courts 
increasingly rejected the paternalistic view that physicians should 
make treatment decisions for patients, recognizing the right of pa-
tients to make their own informed choices.206 The principle of the 
right of self determination reached its apex in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, where the U.S. Supreme Court rec-
ognized that “[t]he informed consent doctrine has become firmly en-
trenched in American tort law” and that the logical corollary of the 
 
 201. Hall, supra note 150, at 471-72. 
 202. Few courts have addressed whether other health professionals, such as pharma-
cists, have a fiduciary duty to their patients. Such claims are usually restricted to in-
stances where the duty to maintain confidential medical information has been breached.  
See Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 951-53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (find-
ing evidence sufficient to establish that hospital breached its fiduciary duty to maintain 
the confidentiality of medical records); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335-37 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (finding that customer stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty where a pharmacy sold confidential medical profiles and prescription information to 
another pharmacy). 
 203. Am. Medical Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Op. 10.015, 
The Patient-Physician Relationship (2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-10.015.HTM&&s_t=& 
st_p=&nth=1&prev_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-9.132.HTM&nxt_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-10.01.HTM&. 
 204. Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual, Fifth Edition, 142 ANN. INTERN. MED. 
560, 561 (2005) [hereinafter ACP, Ethics Manual]. 
 205. See Rodwin, supra note 198, at 247-48; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra 
note 146, at 313 (stating that abandonment is “an infidelity amounting to disloyalty”). 
 206. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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individual’s right to make medical decisions extended to refusing life-
sustaining treatment.207  
 The states are almost evenly divided as to whether the standard 
for informed consent is a professional malpractice standard or a pa-
tient-oriented standard, but all agree that patient autonomy is the 
central focus of the doctrine.208 If informed consent means anything, 
it is that a patient has a legal right to information that can enable 
the patient to make an intelligent decision concerning treatment and 
the alternatives to treatment. “[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, 
not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his 
interests seem to lie.”209 Thus, subject to rare exceptions, patients 
control the right to choose a course of treatment appropriate to their 
own needs and personal conscience.210  
 Basic principles of medical ethics also reflect a consensus among 
the health professions that patients are entitled to be informed. The 
AMA stresses that “[t]he patient’s right to self-decision can be effec-
tively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to 
enable an intelligent choice.”211 The American College of Physicians rec-
ognizes that “[h]owever uncomfortable for the clinician, information that 
is essential to and desired by the patient must be disclosed.”212
(a)   Genetic or Pregnancy Counseling 
 Where the medical decision facing the patient is of profound moral 
or personal significance, courts have repeatedly stated that the deci-
sion to undergo treatment belongs not to the physician or hospital, 
but to the patient. For example, the majority of states recognize a 
tort claim for “wrongful birth” where a physician negligently fails ei-
ther to diagnose a genetic defect in the fetus or inform the parents of 
the need for or the results of genetic testing, thereby depriving the 
 
 207. 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990). 
 208. See Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (providing in 
appendix a summary of state laws on informed consent). A slight majority recognize the 
professional standard where a physician is required to disclose the information that a rea-
sonable, prudent physician would disclose. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 
104 (Ind. 1992). Under the patient-oriented standard, a patient is entitled to be informed of 
material information that a reasonable patient would require. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 
F.2d at 787.  
 209. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781. 
 210. Courts have recognized several exceptions to the duty to provide informed con-
sent, including emergencies where a patient is incompetent or incapable of giving consent 
and circumstances where disclosure would pose a threat of physical or psychological harm 
to the patient. Id. at 789. 
 211. Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Op. 8.08, In-
formed Consent (2005), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n= 
resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-8.08.HTM&s_t=8%2C08&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/ 
BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=3&. 
 212. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 563. 
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woman of the option of terminating the pregnancy.213 Damages are 
awarded for emotional distress, medical expenses associated with 
pregnancy and birth, and, in some states, expenses the parents will 
incur from raising an impaired child.214  
 In these cases, the issue is not whether the physician has firm 
views against abortion or would refuse to perform one; the negligence 
is the failure to inform the parents of a possibly disabling condition of 
the fetus. Courts have differed in their approach as to the conceptual 
basis for the tort. The failure to disclose the need for prenatal testing 
or its results may arise either out of the duty to provide informed 
consent or from professional standards of care.215 Regardless of the 
legal theory, the thrust of wrongful birth cases is the patient’s right 
to adequate information.  
 For instance, in 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the 
parents’ right to be informed about the results of prenatal tests, even 
though at that time Texas barred abortions except to save the life of 
the mother.216  
The complaint is not that the defendant doctor failed to perform an 
abortion or to tell Mrs. Jacobs that she should obtain an abortion 
elsewhere. . . . [T]he plaintiffs contend only that the defendant 
should have given them information as to Mrs. Jacobs’ condition 
and then, with the information she had a right to expect from her 
doctor, the decision would have been made by the plaintiffs them-
selves to terminate the pregnancy. 
   . . . . 
We do not regard the issue before us as requiring our decision of 
the public policy either for or against abortion. This is a matter of 
very different but very deep feeling. . . . [T]he courts should regard 
the question as one to be resolved by the wife and her husband. At 
least, the courts should not penalize them for the choice which 
these plaintiffs say that they would have made.217
 
 213. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Ac-
tions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142-43, 160 (2005) (stating that more than half of all 
jurisdictions have recognized wrongful birth actions). Many states, however, refuse to rec-
ognize a “wrongful life” action brought on behalf of the impaired child. Id. at 161; see also 
Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65-66 (S.C. 2004) (discussing the difference between wrongful 
birth, wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy actions). 
 214. Hensel, supra note 213, at 151-52.  
 215. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Md. 1993) (stating that the duty 
to offer or recommend tests is analyzed according to the professional standard of care, not 
the doctrine of informed consent); Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 813 (N.J. 
1999) (“[T]he informed consent and wrongful birth causes of action are similar in that both 
require the physician to disclose those medically accepted risks that a reasonably prudent 
patient in the plaintiff’s position would deem material to her decision.”); Harbeson v. 
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing duty rooted in doctrine 
of informed consent). 
 216. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975). 
 217. Id. 
2007]                    HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE   813 
 
                                                                                                                   
 The principle of reproductive choice is also seen in situations 
where a woman seeks to avoid pregnancy, but through a physician’s 
negligence, bears a child. In C.S. v. Nielson,218 a patient underwent a 
tubal ligation. After giving birth to a healthy child, she sued the phy-
sician for failing to tell her that the procedure was not “absolute in 
nature.”219 The court held that the plaintiff stated a viable claim, rec-
ognizing that in a case where the patient seeks medical treatment to 
avoid pregnancy altogether, “the pregnancy [of the mother] [i]s a 
medical condition that gives rise to compensable damages.”220 Re-
cently, the Minnesota Supreme Court extended this principle to a 
duty to warn the mother of the results of genetic testing for Fragile X 
syndrome on an existing child, so that she could avoid (through ster-
ilization) conceiving another child with the same genetic disorder.221  
 These decisions recognize the duty of health professionals to im-
part information to their patients as to the likelihood of a future 
child being born with a birth defect or other anomaly so that parents 
can decide whether to exercise their right to prevent the conception 
or birth of a child. This professional duty exists even though the 
physician may retain the right to deny care to which the physician 
morally objects.222  
 The ethical duty to disclose relevant information about 
human reproduction to the patient may conflict with the 
physician’s personal moral standards on abortion, steriliza-
tion, contraception, or other reproductive services. A physi-
cian who objects to these services is not obligated to recom-
mend, perform, or prescribe them. As in any other medical 
situation, however, the physician has a duty to inform the 
patient about care options and alternatives, or refer the pa-
tient for such information, so that the patient’s rights are 
not constrained. Physicians unable to provide such informa-
tion should transfer care as long as the health of the patient 
is not compromised.223
 Under prevailing law and general medical ethics, physicians are 
not free to refuse to tell a person about medical alternatives simply 
because they disagree with the choice the patient may make. The 
 
 218. 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).  
 219. Id. at 505. These cases are known as wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception 
cases. See generally Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and 
Wrongful Birth in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 
583 (1995). 
 220. Nielson, 767 P.2d at 508. 
 221. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Minn. 2004). 
 222. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 455, 491 (stating that the duty to im-
part material information does not affect the physician’s right to refuse to perform an abor-
tion on religious or moral grounds). 
 223. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 564. 
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duty to inform, grounded as it is in fiduciary principles, also seems 
broad enough to encompass a patient’s right to know whether a phy-
sician has a personal, moral belief that might affect the physician’s 
professional judgment.224 Even where the concerns of the provider 
are sincere, they do not support nondisclosure.225  
 The ethical dilemma for families in these situations is no less for-
midable than it is for physicians.226 The question is who has the 
right, given accurate information, to choose a suitable course of ac-
tion. The recent trend in conscience legislation—from allowing pro-
viders to deny particular services that violate their moral or ethical 
views to allowing them to refuse to counsel patients about medical 
options—deprives patients of their basic right to control their own 
treatment. Are we prepared to recognize an exception to standards of 
care in this area for providers who view their own moral beliefs as 
superior to the woman’s right to make medical decisions based on her 
own deeply held personal beliefs? “Conscientious objection implies 
the physician’s right not to participate in what she thinks morally 
wrong, even if the patient demands it. It does not presume the right 
to impose her will or conception of the good on the patient.”227 The 
measures enacted or considered by legislators allowing providers to 
refuse to counsel patients on controversial issues are designed to al-
low providers to retreat from their legal and ethical responsibilities.  
(b) Emergency Contraception: Science or Belief? 
 Contraceptives—and in particular, emergency contraceptives—
have become a new front in the culture war.228 In this climate, some 
politicians and legislators have been persuaded that emergency con-
traception is a form of abortion or at least a subject to be avoided. In 
 
 224. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New 
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 274 (1985) (“Decisions made in a climate of conflicting 
values or judgments are every bit as consequential to patients as those made when there 
are conflicts of interest.”); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 
(Cal. 1990) (stating that a patient has a right to know of a conflicting economic interest 
that could affect the physician’s judgment). 
 225. Dr. Pellegrino, arguing from a Catholic perspective, states that in effecting rights 
of conscience, professionals do not have the right to impose their concept of what is good 
and that “patients have an uncontested moral right to informed consent and informed re-
fusal.” Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 241-42. However, the directives for Catholic health 
care services provide that although “[f]ree and informed consent” is required, a person is 
entitled to receive information only about “any reasonable and morally legitimate alterna-
tives.” U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, Directive 27 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Ethical and Religious Direc-
tives] (emphasis added), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml. 
 226. See Elizabeth Weil, A Wrongful Birth?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, § 6, at 48.  
 227. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 242. 
 228. For an interesting discussion of the political and social underpinnings of the cur-
rent controversy over contraception, see Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2006, § 6, at 48. 
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late 2004, the U.S Department of Justice released a comprehensive 
protocol for health care providers dealing with examination and 
treatment of sexual assault victims.229 Although a draft had appar-
ently mentioned pregnancy prophylaxis,230 the final guidelines omit 
any reference to emergency contraception—instead suggesting that 
health care providers “discuss treatment options with patients, in-
cluding reproductive health services.”231 The failure to mention emer-
gency contraception as one of the services available (and the only one 
geared toward preventing pregnancy) created an uproar.232  
 States have also targeted emergency contraception. In 2005, Colo-
rado Governor Bill Owens vetoed a bill requiring hospitals to provide 
sexual assault victims with information about emergency contracep-
tion, on the basis that “it does not provide victims with the full, bal-
anced and detailed array of information they deserve to make this 
deeply personal decision about emergency contraception.”233 The in-
formation not being provided to victims, according to Governor 
Owens, was that “[o]ne method that is covered by this legislation 
would prevent a fertilized egg from imbedding in the uterine wall.”234   
 Similarly, in a five-year demonstration project to expand eligibil-
ity for family planning services in the Medicaid population, Texas 
specifically excluded counseling, education, and the provision of 
emergency contraception from the services that would be covered.235 
South Dakota allows pharmacists to refuse to dispense a medication 
 
 229. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL 
PROTOCOL FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ovw/206554.pdf. 
 230. See Marie McCullough, Sex-Assault Treatment Guidelines Omit Pill, PHILA. INQ., 
Dec. 31, 2004, at A01. 
 231. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMAN, supra note 229, at 111. 
 232. See Letter from ACLU et al. to Jana White, Office of Violence Against Women, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org//reproductiverights/gen/ 
12743res20050106.html (providing the names of more than 277 signatures of organizations 
and individuals who requested amendment to the protocol to include a discussion of emer-
gency contraceptives). Ninety-seven members of Congress also petitioned the Department 
to include a reference to emergency contraceptives in its guidelines. Letter from the Con-
gress of the United States to Diane M. Stuart, Director, Office on Violence Against Women, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 13, 2005), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov/documents/olddocs/choice/011305DOJ.pdf. The AMA adopted a 
policy urging the Justice Department to amend its protocol to include a discussion of emer-
gency contraception for sexual assault victims. House of Delegates, Am. Med. Ass’n, Policy 
D-75.996, Emergency Contraception for Sexual Assault Victims (2005), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&p_p=T&&s_t=&st_p=&nth= 
1&prev_pol=policyfiles/DIR/D-75.996.HTM&nxt_pol=policyfiles/DIR/D-75.998.HTM&.  
 233. Letter from Bill Owens, Governor, State of Col., to the Col. House of Representatives 
(Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://www.colorado.gov/governor/press/april05/1042.html. 
 234. Id. In 2007, Governor Owens’ successor signed legislation requiring health care 
facilities to provide rape victims with information about the availability of emergency con-
traception. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-110(2) (2007). 
 235. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.0248(a)(4)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 2006). 
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they believe will be used to cause an abortion.236 It appears this legis-
lation is directed in part at contraceptives, as pharmacists are cur-
rently prohibited by the FDA from dispensing “abortion” drugs such 
as mifepristone.237 Even nonsectarian pharmacies find emergency 
contraceptives controversial. Until recently, Wal-Mart, which oper-
ates the largest chain of pharmacies in the United States, refused to 
stock emergency contraceptives even though it filled prescriptions for 
regular birth control pills.238  
 There is, however, no reasonable basis for politicians, let alone 
medical professionals, to treat emergency contraceptives differently 
than “the pill” used by millions of women. Emergency contraceptives 
share the same mechanism as regular contraceptives, and the preva-
lent medical knowledge is that oral contraceptives are not abortifa-
cients.239 Central to the concept of informed consent is that the in-
formation conveyed to the patient be accurate and based on the latest 
medical knowledge. The real debate over emergency contraceptives is 
a scientific, not a moral debate.  
 The FDA has approved two emergency contraceptives: Preven in 
1998 and Plan B in 1999.240 The manufacturer of Preven has with-
drawn it from the market, leaving Plan B as the only dedicated 
emergency contraceptive pharmaceutical sold in the United States.241 
Plan B contains levonorgestrel, a hormone that has been used in 
birth control pills for over thirty-five years.242 Emergency contracep-
tives, often referred to as “morning-after” pills, do not include mife-
pristone, known as RU-486, or any other drug that induces an abor-
tion, and they do not interfere with an established pregnancy.243   
 
 236. See supra note 30.     
 237. Mifepristone, also known as RU-486, is marketed as Mifeprex. Bills allowing 
pharmacists to opt out of providing abortion drugs would not include mifepristone be-
cause it is not available by prescription. Only physicians may dispense the drug. U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., Mifepristone Approval Letter (2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2000/20687appltr.pdf. 
 238. Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart to Carry Plan B Emergency Contraception 
(Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1704.aspx. 
 239. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/ 
infopage/planB/planBQandA20060824.htm [hereinafter “PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS”]. Common oral contraceptive pills can also be used as emergency contracep-
tives by altering the regularly prescribed dose. For example, Planned Parenthood provides 
information concerning the brand of pill and dose that can be used as an emergency 
contraceptive.  Planned Parenthood, Emergency Contraception, available at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/birth-control-pregnancy/emergency-contraception-
4363%20.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). 
 240. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239. 
 241. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 10. 
 242. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239.   
 243. NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 3 (2006), (stating 
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 Confusion about the role of emergency contraception stems from 
the supposition that emergency contraceptives (and even routine 
birth control pills) may interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg 
in the uterus.244 Despite a paucity of evidence that emergency contra-
ceptives have such an effect, some scientists and physicians have 
postulated that they could alter the endrometrium245 to provide a 
hostile environment to a fertilized egg.246 Barr Pharmaceuticals, 
the manufacturer of Plan B, includes this possible mechanism of 
action in its drug pamphlet.247 To those who believe pregnancy be-
gins with conception, emergency contraceptives, a fortiori, may 
cause an early abortion.248  
 This view of the role of emergency contraceptives is questionable 
for two reasons. First, there is broad medical and scientific consensus 
that pregnancy begins with implantation of the blastocyst249 in the 
uterus, not with fertilization.250 This perspective is apparently 
shared by Congress, which, for purposes of penalizing crimes against 
pregnant women, defines an unborn child as one “in utero.”251 Fed-
eral agencies also accept this definition of pregnancy. According to 
federal regulations governing research on pregnant human subjects, 
“[p]regnancy encompasses the period of time from implantation until 
 
that emergency contraception prevents pregnancy and is not the same as an “abortion 
pill”), available at http://www.4woman.gov/faq/econtracep.pdf. 
 244. A recent study of the views of South Dakota pharmacists disclosed that “thirty-
seven percent of the surveyed pharmacists did not know that emergency contraceptive pills 
and regular oral contraceptive pills have a similar mechanism of action.” Kristi K. Van 
Riper & Wendy L. Hellerstedt, Emergency Contraceptive Pills: Dispensing Practices, 
Knowledge and Attitudes of South Dakota Pharmacists, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH 19, 22 (2005). A 2003 survey of family medicine providers revealed only fifty-six 
percent correctly responded that emergency contraception is not an abortifacient. Jennifer 
L. Wallace et al., Emergency Contraception: Knowledge and Attitudes of Family Medicine 
Providers, 36 FAM. MED. 417, 420 (2004). 
 245. The endometrium is the lining of the uterus. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
592 (27th ed. 2000). 
 246. See Chris Kahlenborn et al., Postfertilization Effect of Hormonal Emergency 
Contraception, 36 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 465, 467 (2002) (stating that data sup-
port the hypothesis that emergency contraceptives have a postfertilization effect on 
the endometrium).       
 247. PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1076 (61st ed. 2007) (noting that Plan B acts pri-
marily to prevent ovulation or fertilization, but that it may also inhibit implantation). 
 248. See Kahlenborn, supra note 246, at 468.  
 249. A blastocyst is “an early stage of embryo development consisting of the inner cell mass 
and a thick cellular enclosure.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 245, at 211. 
 250. See Paul R. Pentel et al., Hospital-Based Emergency Contraception, Letter, in Re-
ply, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 1771, 1772 (2004) (stating that it is the consensus of 
the World Health Organization, the FDA, the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, the Association of Reproductive Health Physicians, the American Public Health 
Association, and the AMA that pregnancy begins with implantation). 
 251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(d) (West 2006).  
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delivery.”252 On its public website, the FDA states: “Plan B works like 
a birth control pill to prevent pregnancy . . . .”253  
 The few courts that have weighed in on this issue have taken a 
similar position. In a case challenging a Wisconsin law that regu-
lated informed consent practice for abortions, the plaintiffs asserted 
that Wisconsin’s definition of abortion was so vague that it would 
chill physicians from providing emergency contraception.254 The court 
noted that the source of the controversy lay in the legislature’s fail-
ure to define pregnancy. The court resolved this issue by ruling:  
 Under the standard medical definition, pregnancy does not 
begin until the zygote’s implantation in the uterus, approxi-
mately six days after conception. However, some doctors, in-
cluding defendants’ witness, Dr. Nina Kiekhaefer, believe 
that pregnancy begins with conception. Plaintiffs assert that 
because of the legislature’s failure to define pregnancy, they 
do not know whether AB 441 applies to emergency contra-
ception. . . . The only reasonable way to read AB 441 is as 
adopting the standard medical definition of pregnancy 
rather than the definition espoused by Dr. Kiekhaefer. If the 
legislature had chosen to depart from the standard defini-
tion, it would have made that choice explicit. There is no 
reason to assume that the legislature chose a minority defi-
nition when the statutory text gives no indication of such 
a decision.255
 Is this mere semantics?256 Some argue that even if pregnancy 
technically does not begin until implantation, human life begins with 
fertilization of the egg, and anything that destroys incipient life is an 
 
 252. 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (2005). 
 253. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239 (emphasis added). 
 254. Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1228 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 255. Id. at 1228; see also Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 05-
3672, 2007 WL 2743446, at *14-15 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2007) (rejecting the free exercise claim 
of a sixteen year old girl and her parents who contended that the city health department 
deceived the teenager when it failed to tell her emergency contraception could prevent im-
plantation of an fertilized ovum). The court noted that the clinic’s statement that emer-
gency contraception prevents pregnancy was accurate and supported by the FDA). Id at 
*15; Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-91 (E.D. La. 1980) (finding that statute 
defining abortion was not vague, despite a contention that it could include two birth con-
trol methods, an intrauterine device and emergency contraception); Brownfield v. Daniel 
Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a Catho-
lic hospital could not refuse to provide emergency contraceptives to a rape victim under a 
statute that allowed conscientious objections to abortion because emergency contraceptives 
were not equivalent to an abortion). 
 256. When fertilization occurs outside the human body, as in in vitro fertilization, it is 
evident that pregnancy has not begun. Thus, fertilization and pregnancy cannot be syn-
onymous in all cases. 
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abortifacient.257 Thus, a health care provider should have the right to 
refuse to inform patients about emergency contraception according to 
the provider’s moral or religious conscience. What recent scientific 
research has shown, however, is that even if one believes that human 
life begins with a fertilized egg, emergency contraceptives likely do 
not have a postfertilization effect. 
 The precise mechanism of action of emergency contraceptives has 
been the subject of much research. Within the past several years, 
studies from around the world have concluded that the probable 
mode of action of emergency contraceptives, and particularly the 
levonorgestrel-only emergency contraceptive (Plan B), is to suppress 
or interfere with ovulation, not to prevent implantation.258 Citing sci-
entific literature, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
recently concluded that “[Emergency contraceptives] have not been 
shown to cause a postfertilization event—a change in the uterus that 
could interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg.”259 The GAO 
noted, however, that the possibility that emergency contraceptives 
interfere with implantation cannot be unequivocally ruled out, as it 
would be unethical and difficult to perform the research needed to 
prove otherwise.260   
 The best scientific evidence to date, therefore, is that emergency 
contraceptives are not abortifacients. Acceptance of this conclusion 
by the regulatory, scientific, and medical communities has broad im-
plications for states enacting conscience clauses and for health care 
providers refusing to discuss emergency contraceptives. Although 
there is little in science or medicine that is absolutely certain, it 
seems fairly straightforward that legislation affecting the health of 
 
 257. See Kahlenborn, supra note 246, at 468.  
 258. See H.B. Croxatto et al, Pituitary-Ovarian Function Following the Standard 
Levonorgestrel Emergency Contraceptive Dose or a Single 0.75-mg Dose Given on the Days 
Preceding Ovulation, 70 CONTRACEPTION 442, 449 (2004) (stating that “studies support the 
notion that [levonorgstrel] prevents pregnancy in women through prefertilization effects”); 
Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Lena Marions, Mechanisms of Action of Mifepristone and 
Levonorgestrel When Used for Emergency Contraception, 10 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 341, 
346 (2004) (concluding that levonorgestrel when used in low doses for emergency contra-
ception primarily acts to block or delay ovulation, but does not prevent implantation); Na-
talia Novikova, et al., Effectiveness of Levonorgestrel Emergency Contraception Given Be-
fore or After Ovulation−A Pilot Study, 75 CONTRACEPTION 112, 116 (2007) (concluding that 
current data are consistent with the premise that emergency contraception has “little or no 
effect on postovulation events”); Roberto Rivera et al., The Mechanism of Action of Hormo-
nal Contraceptives and Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices, 181 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1263, 1267 (1999) (concluding that there is no scientific evidence supporting 
the possibility that emergency contraceptives have an abortifacient effect). 
 259. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: DECISION 
PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE 
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 13 (2005) (criticizing the FDA’s 
handling of Barr Pharmaceutical’s application to switch Plan B to over-the-counter status), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf.  
 260. Id. 
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large numbers of women should not be based on an unproven (and 
apparently unprovable) theory. The issue is not when life begins. 
How a drug works is not a matter of conscience, but of science.261 
Even some in the pro-life movement have recognized this distinc-
tion and broken ranks with those who consider contraceptives a 
form of abortion.262
 The tension between moral refusals to provide information about 
treatment alternatives and the patient’s welfare arises most strik-
ingly with sexual assault victims who are deprived of information 
about emergency contraception. Surveys have demonstrated that 
many women are not generally aware of the availability of emer-
gency contraception and often confuse emergency contraceptives with 
the abortion drug, RU-486.263 In order to exercise their right to make 
informed value judgments about treatment alternatives, patients 
need to know at a minimum what alternatives exist, even if they are 
not offered by the provider. In other words, patients have a right to 
expect honesty from those who treat them about all available choices.  
 Efforts to ensure that rape victims receive information about the 
availability of emergency contraception as a means of pregnancy 
prophylaxis have had mixed results. A number of states require hos-
pitals to provide information about emergency contraceptives and/or 
dispense the medication upon request to rape victims.264 Professional 
associations such as the AMA, American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, American Academy of Pediatrics, and American Public 
Health Association have also adopted guidelines indicating that the 
 
 261. Although the courts must refrain from questioning the sincerity or plausibility of 
religious beliefs, see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 
(1981), the issue here is not the validity of a belief that all contraception is morally wrong 
or when life begins. Rather, the issue is whether a particular contraceptive has a postfer-
tilization effect.  
 262. See Steve Chapman, For Those Who Believe in the Sanctity of Life, Why Morning-
After Pill Is Pro-Life and Not Abortion in Disguise, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 27; 
see also SUSAN A. CROCKETT ET AL., HORMONE CONTRACEPTIVES CONTROVERSIES AND 
CLARIFICATIONS (1999) (concluding that oral contraceptives do not cause failure of implan-
tation of the fertilized egg), available at http://www.aaplog.org/decook.htm. 
 263. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN’S HEALTH POLICY FACTS, EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION 1-2 (2005) (citing results of a 2004 survey that thirty-six percent of 
women denied knowledge of emergency contraception and a 2003 survey that seventy-five 
percent of women in California did not know the difference between emergency contracep-
tives and RU-486), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/3344-03.pdf.  
 264. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.11(e)(1) (West 2006); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 
(2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 111, § 70E(o) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§2805p(2) (McKinney 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1350(b) (2003) (stating that if re-
quested, a sexual assault victim must be provided “medication for pregnancy prevention”); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 322.004(b)(4), 322.005(2) (Vernon 2006) (providing 
that facilities treating rape victims must inform them about the appropriateness and con-
traindications of medications prescribed to prevent pregnancy). 
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medical standard of care is to advise rape victims about emergency 
contraceptives.265 The AMA’s guidelines provide: 
Female patients must be counseled about options for pregnancy 
prevention. If the physician has moral reservations about person-
ally delivering this counseling, he or she is responsible to have 
someone else inform the patient of her relative risk of pregnancy 
and provide prophylaxis. Physicians are obligated to ensure that 
sexual assault patients are properly informed of all risks and in-
terventions to prevent conception as a result of the assault.266
 Yet recent surveys have shown that, despite state mandates and 
the prevailing standard of care, many victims are not receiving this 
information.267 Very few situations involving the failure under state 
law to provide information about emergency contraceptives to sexual 
assault victims have been litigated. In one case, a California appel-
late court held that a Catholic hospital could be liable for malpractice 
for failing to provide a rape victim with information about emergency 
contraceptives, even though the refusal was based on religious 
grounds.268 Refusal laws allowing physicians to decline to counsel or 
advise women on this option may only exacerbate the problem. 
“Rights of conscience in health care must be exercised in the context 
of patient rights to informed consent.”269 Allowing silence about preg-
nancy prophylaxis effectively forces sexual assault victims and other 
women to make decisions based on beliefs they may not share.270  
 
 265. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Emergency Contraception, 116 PEDIATRICS 1026, 102 
(2005) (stating that emergency contraceptives should be offered to rape or abuse victims 
when the assault was within the past 72-120 hours); AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, POLICY 
STATEMENT 29 (2003) (“Offering emergency contraception to sexual assault survivors at 
risk of pregnancy is the accepted standard of care.”), available at 
http://go2ec.org/pdfs/Endorsement_APHA_SexualAssault.pdf; Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin # 69, Emergency Contraception, 106 J. OBSTET. 
GYNECOL & 1443, 1446 (2005) (recommending that emergency contraception be given to all 
women who have had unprotected sexual intercourse and who do not desire pregnancy). 
 266. AM. MED. ASS’, STRATEGIES FOR THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 15 (1995), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/386/sexualassault.pdf 
(footnote omitted). 
 267. See CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, COMPLYING WITH THE LAW? HOW 
CATHOLIC HOSPITALS RESPOND TO STATE LAWS MANDATING THE PROVISION OF 
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION TO SEXUAL ASSAULT PATIENTS 7-8 (2006), 
http://www.cath4choice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/2006complyingwiththelaw.pdf. 
 268. Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242, 245 (1989). 
In Brownfield, however, the plaintiff could not prove she suffered any damage as the result 
of the denial of information and was not allowed to proceed on the claim. Id. at 245. 
 269. Thomas May, Rights of Conscience in Health Care, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 111, 
127 (2001). 
 270. The FDA’s recent approval of nonprescription status for Plan B may improve ac-
cess, but it does not address the issue of pharmacist refusals to provide the drug on grounds 
of conscience. There is no requirement that Plan B be stocked by pharmacies and, where 
available, it must be kept behind the counter. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 10. 
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D.   Duty to Refer or Transfer 
 Once a relationship is established, the general rule is that a pro-
vider may not unilaterally sever the relationship without reasonable 
notice or providing alternative care for a patient in need of continu-
ing medical services.271 If immediate treatment is indicated, which 
the physician can not or will not provide, there is an obligation to re-
fer or arrange care by another professional.272 This obligation is not 
obviated simply because there may be a conflict between the profes-
sional’s moral values and the patient’s desires. Where a denial or de-
lay of care would cause suffering or serious harm to the patient, the 
legal solution to the conflict is to refer or transfer the patient to an-
other provider. Professional organizations also recognize the ethical 
duty to maintain continuity of care when professionals decline to 
participate in the provision of treatment to a patient. For instance, 
the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual recommends that 
if a physician and patient cannot resolve their differences on the 
medical care to be pursued, the physician should consider transfer-
ring the patient to another caregiver.273  
 Objections on grounds of conscience to this duty often concern the 
question of moral complicity in enabling or facilitating an immoral 
act. “To cooperate in an act which is regarded as inherently morally 
wrong . . . is to be a moral accomplice.”274 For example, if a physician 
refuses to perform an elective abortion, she should not be required to 
refer a patient to a physician who does because that makes her mor-
ally complicit in association with an evil.275 Yet the law would not re-
quire referral in this instance. There is no duty to arrange for the as-
 
 271. Grant v. Douglas Women’s Clinic, 580 S.E.2d 532, 533-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding that there was a fact issue on whether physician properly withdrew from case); 
Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963) (stating that a physician should not 
leave a patient needing treatment without giving reasonable notice or making arrange-
ments for the attendance of another physician); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 
1937) (holding a physician liable for refusing to treat patient in need of care unless patient 
paid previous account).  
 272. Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (holding physician li-
able in tort for abandoning woman in labor); Johnson, 370 S.W.2d at 597 (finding physician 
liable for obstructing release of patient to another physician). 
 273. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 562. 
 274. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 239. Some individuals have not been as eloquent as 
Dr. Pellegrino in their objections to referring patients for moral reasons. Karen Brauer, 
President of Pharmacists for Life International, is quoted as saying, “That’s like saying, ‘I 
don’t kill people myself but let me tell you about the guy down the street who does.’ What’s 
that saying? ‘I will not off your husband, but I know a buddy who will?’ It’s the same 
thing.” Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, 
at A01.  
 275. Some pharmacists have argued that they should not be required to transfer pre-
scriptions they object to filling. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The concept of 
moral cooperation would not seem to prohibit transferring information or records, however. 
See Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 240. 
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sumption of care by another provider where the patient will merely 
be inconvenienced or will not suffer harm by the temporary refusal of 
care.276 Further, professionals are free to terminate care of patients 
upon reasonable notice even if the patient requires continuing, but 
nonemergent, care without a corresponding duty to find another phy-
sician.277 The duty to transfer or refer arises where significant harm 
will ensue if the patient is simply abandoned by the caregiver. 
 Relegating the provider’s obligations by transfer of care may not 
always be the appropriate means to resolve conflicts between a pro-
vider’s conscience and the patient’s medical needs. In situations 
where a patient’s condition does not permit transfer or where there is 
no provider willing to assume care of the patient, another approach 
to resolve patient-provider disputes may be necessary. Referral to 
another professional should also not be a convenient excuse for 
unlawful discrimination. Bioethicist Thomas May states: 
[I]t is not clear that a policy of “transfer of care” is always accept-
able, as it fails to consider adequately the reasons upon which a 
right of conscience may appropriately be exercised, and the effect 
of transfer of care on the patient’s access to care. Allowing “unlim-
ited” rights of conscience through transfer of care leaves open the 
possibility of discriminatory practices and transfer that is contrary 
to the patient’s best interests.278
1.   End-of-Life Care 
 Today, we take for granted that individuals have the prerogative 
to withdraw or withhold care if faced with a terminal or irreversible 
illness. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional 
underpinning of the right to refuse lifesaving treatment.279 Despite 
widespread support for this privilege, there are instances where hos-
pitals and physicians decline to honor a patient’s end-of-life decision 
whether expressed directly, through an advance directive, or by a 
surrogate. This is a problem of special concern at Catholic-affiliated 
institutions. Catholic teachings on the patient’s right to refuse life-
 
 276. An abandonment claim sounds in negligence, and harm must be proved. See E. 
Ala. Behavioral Med. v. Chancey, 883 So.2d 162, 172 (Ala. 2003) (finding no abandonment 
where plaintiffs failed to allege any injury).  
 277. See Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding 
that physician had no continuing legal obligation to provide outpatient renal dialysis to an 
uncooperative patient after the physician gave her reasonable notice and an opportunity to 
find another facility). 
 278. May, supra note 269, at 112. Another bioethicist, George Annas, has called the 
transfer of persons refusing end-of-life treatment “ethical dumping.” George J. Annas, At 
Law: Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 21 (1987). 
 279. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming 
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration). 
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sustaining care, including the refusal or withdrawal of artificial nu-
trition and hydration, state that an institution “will not honor an ad-
vance directive that is contrary to Catholic teaching.”280 There is also 
a presumption favoring nutrition and hydration unless the burdens 
of such outweigh the benefits to the patient.281 Pope John Paul II in-
jected some uncertainty into this issue in March 2004 when he an-
nounced that the administration of artificial hydration and nutrition 
to a person in a persistent vegetative state is not a medical act.282 
The Pope’s comments led ethicists at the National Catholic Bioethics 
Center to state that advance directives requesting the removal of nu-
trition and “hydration in cases of a persistent vegetative state, may 
have to be reconsidered.”283
 However, it is not only Catholic physicians or hospitals that may 
find it difficult to honor a patient’s request to withhold or withdraw 
treatment. A recent survey of internists found that many were less 
likely to agree to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hy-
dration or antibiotics than other treatments, such as a ventilator or 
dialysis.284 In recognition of the different ethical perspectives in end-
of-life care, most advance directive laws allow providers to refuse to 
follow the wishes of patients and their surrogates when to do so 
would violate their professional or institutional conscience.285 Unlike 
the newer refusal laws, however, advance directive statutes gener-
ally expect providers to inform the patient of the conflict, to attempt 
to resolve patient-provider disputes, and, if necessary, to transfer the 
patient to another provider. Under Texas law, for example, if the 
physician disagrees with the patient’s advance directive or treatment 
decision, the matter must first be referred to an ethics committee for 
resolution, with the opportunity for input from the patient or surro-
 
 280. Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 225, Directive 24. 
 281. Id., Directive 58.  
 282. Pope John Paul II, The Vatican, Address to the Participants in the International 
Congress: Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethi-
cal Dilemmas (Mar. 20, 2004), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/ 
2004/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc_en.html. In Cruzan, artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration were assumed to be medical intervention. See 497 U.S. at 278.  
 283. Nat’l Catholic Bioethics Ctr., Statement of the NCBC on Pope John Paul II’s Ad-
dress on Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in PVS (2004), http://www.ncbcenter.org/ 
04-04-23-NCBCStatementonNutritionandHydration.asp. The Vatican recently reaffirmed 
its position that artificial nutrition and hydration are ordinary means of preserving life 
and obligatory under most circumstances. The Vatican, Response to Certain Questions of 
the United States Conferences of Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
(Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_ 
cfaith_doc_20070801_risposte-usa_en.html. 
 284. Neil J. Farber et al, Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 166 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 560, 562 (2006).  
 285. See White, supra note 9, at 1721 (noting that a majority of states allow health care 
providers to refuse to participate in withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining care).  
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gate.286 If the physician disagrees with the decision of the committee, 
the physician and the facility must make an effort to transfer the pa-
tient to another caregiver that is willing to comply with the patient’s 
request.287 If a health professional does not comply with the statutory 
provisions when refusing to honor the patient’s directive, the profes-
sional may be subject to disciplinary action or other civil remedies.288  
 The courts have also been called upon to resolve disputes between 
patients or their surrogates seeking to end life-sustaining care and 
hospitals or professionals who conscientiously decline to participate 
in the withholding or withdrawal of treatment. The lack of notice to a 
patient of the provider’s religious or ethical policies has been an im-
portant factor in several cases. In Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great 
Neck, Inc., the court concluded that the ethical objections of the facil-
ity were outweighed by the patient’s right to decline a feeding 
tube.289 The court stated: 
[W]e find significant the fact that the defendants failed to make 
the facility’s policy on the issue known to the Elbaum family until 
after the family requested the removal of the gastrointestinal tube. 
Thus, the Elbaum family had no reason to believe that Mrs. El-
baum was relinquishing her right of self-determination with re-
gard to her medical care upon her admission to the facility.290
The court ruled that if the parties were unable to effect the patient’s 
transfer to another facility that would abide by her wishes, the hospi-
tal would be required to assist the patient by removing the tube or 
permitting a physician selected by the patient’s family to carry out 
her wishes at the hospital.291
 Similarly, in Gray v. Romeo, the hospital opposed removal of arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration from the patient, viewing such action 
as “tantamount to euthanasia, inconsistent with the physician’s role 
as safekeeper of his or her patient’s well being.”292 The court held 
that the patient had a constitutional right to refuse nutrition and 
hydration and had not been notified upon entering the hospital that 
she would be surrendering this privilege.293 The hospital was ordered 
to accede to her request unless she was promptly transferred to a fa-
cility that would respect her wishes.294
 
 286. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006). 
 287. § 166.046(d). 
 288. § 166.045(b). 
 289. 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 290. Id. at 848. 
 291. Id. 
 292. 697 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.R.I. 1988). 
 293. Id. at 590. 
 294. Id. at 591; see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987), stay denied sub 
nom., Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987) (direct-
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 Courts are willing to protect a health care provider’s right of con-
science to refuse life-sustaining treatment where another provider is 
willing to carry out the patient’s request. In Conservatorship of Mor-
rison, physicians objected to the conservator’s request to remove a 
nasogastric tube from a 90-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative 
state.295 The court concluded that the physicians should not be forced 
to act against their beliefs where they were willing to transfer care to 
another physician. “The prevailing viewpoint among medical ethi-
cists appears to be that a physician has the right to refuse on per-
sonal moral grounds to follow a conservator’s direction to withhold 
life-sustaining treatment, but must be willing to transfer the patient 
to another physician who will follow the conservator’s direction.”296 
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to force the 
hospital to remove a patient’s feeding tube over its ethical objections 
and instead directed the hospital to assist the guardian in transfer-
ring the patient to another facility that was willing to end the provi-
sion of artificial nutrition and hydration.297  
 Where transfer cannot be accomplished, either because no other 
provider will accept the patient or the patient’s condition does not 
warrant removal to another facility, several courts have held that the 
patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining measures overrides the pro-
fessional’s moral or ethical objection and that the provider must re-
spect the patient’s wishes.298 The New Jersey Supreme Court di-
rected a nursing home that objected on moral grounds to withdrawal 
of a gastrostomy tube from a patient who had resided there for six 
years to honor a request to remove the tube rather than transferring 
the patient.299 The court recognized the burden it was placing on 
nursing personnel but concluded that “to allow the nursing home to 
discharge Mrs. Jobes if her family does not consent to continued arti-
ficial feeding would essentially frustrate Mrs. Jobe’s right of self-
determination.”300 In In re Requena, the trial court was faced with a 
 
ing treatment over the nursing home’s objections where it did not inform the patient’s fam-
ily of its policy about artificial feeding until they requested it be withdrawn).  
 295. 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  
 296. Id. at 534. The court left unanswered whether it would order the withdrawal of 
treatment if the patient could not be transferred. “The issue of whether a court could com-
pel physicians to act contrary to their ethical views is too profound for gratuitous discus-
sion in a dictum. Its resolution must await an appropriate case.” Id. at 535. 
 297. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638-40 (Mass. 1986).  
 298. Courts have recognized that upholding the medical ethics of the profession is a 
factor to weigh in determining if a patient’s right to withhold or refuse treatment may be 
overridden. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589. The ethics of the medical profession may differ 
from the individual ethics or morals of the provider, however. “(C)onsideration of the integ-
rity of medical ethics does not present a compelling justification to refuse Marcia Gray’s 
wishes. Indeed, medical ethics incorporates the principle that the patient, not the health 
care provider, determines what the course of care should be.”). Id. 
 299. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450. 
 300. Id. 
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request by a Catholic hospital to compel a patient dying of amyotro-
phic lateral sclerosis to leave the hospital because she refused artifi-
cial feeding.301 Despite the hospital’s willingness to transfer the pa-
tient to another institution willing to accept her, the court declined to 
order her removal because it would be “emotionally and psychologi-
cally upsetting to be forced to leave the Hospital.”302 Both Jobes and 
In re Requena preceded New Jersey’s and most other states’ advance 
directive statutes. Under these laws, it would appear that only in ex-
ceptional circumstances would providers be faced with the prospect 
of carrying out actions that conflict with their faith or ethics because 
they are required on admission to give notice to patients of their poli-
cies and, if a conflict occurs later, permitted to transfer patients if 
they cannot honor a patient’s directive.303       
 These legal precedents affirm the principles that a health care fa-
cility or professional has a duty (1) to provide prior notice of its poli-
cies where they may conflict with the patient’s right to withhold or 
withdraw treatment and (2) to assist in the transfer or referral of a 
patient to another provider where a conflict ensues between the pa-
tient and the health care team that cannot be informally resolved. 
Under the broad conscience clauses being proposed today, however, 
patients or their families would seem to be left on their own if the 
provider refused to honor a request or directive. Such legislation does 
not require that the objecting physician or hospital transfer or refer a 
patient in a terminal or irreversible condition whose refusal of care is 
not honored. This omission contradicts case law, advance directive 
statutes, and professional codes of ethics that recognize that in end-
of-life conflicts, health care providers are obliged to ensure continuity 
of care, either through transferring the patient or, in rare circum-
stances if that cannot be accomplished, acceding to the patient’s or 
surrogate’s requests.304  
 
 301. 517 A.2d 886, 887-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), aff’d, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
 302. Id. at 889-90. 
 303. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(b) (West 1996) (allowing a private, religiously af-
filiated institution to decline services if its policies are communicated to the patient either 
on admission or as soon after as practical, and if a conflict cannot be resolved, effecting 
“the appropriate, timely and respectful transfer of the patient to the care of another health 
care institution appropriate to the patient’s needs”).  
 304. Even where an advance directive statute permits transfer, there may be difficult 
and irresolvable situations where the patient cannot be transferred. See FLA. STAT. § 
765.1105(2) (2006) (providing that a where a facility or professional is unwilling to carry out a 
patient’s or surrogate’s decision, the provider must within seven days transfer the patient or, 
if the patient is not transferred, carry out the wishes of the patient or surrogate).  
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V.   LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CONSCIENCE CLAUSES 
 Broad refusal laws prompt serious constitutional questions, as 
well as raise the potential for conflict with many existing federal and 
state laws. These concerns are grounded primarily in the failure of 
these laws to consider the burden they place on patients and to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations for workplace disputes over morals 
and the delivery of care.  
A.   The Establishment Clause 
 A detailed analysis of the Establishment Clause is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Yet a brief discussion is in order because con-
science laws illustrate the tension between the Religion Clauses: ac-
commodations to relieve burdens on religious practices under the 
Free Exercise Clause may not be permissible under the Establish-
ment Clause. Although Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Estab-
lishment Clause has been described as “confused”305 or “murky,”306 a 
few basic principles have emerged. 
 Legislative accommodations are reasonable and consistent with 
the Establishment Clause when they have a secular purpose and do 
not serve primarily to advance religion or foster an excessive entan-
glement with religion.307 Courts also inquire whether the benefits 
under the statute single out religion, are afforded to both religious 
and nonreligious groups, or impose an undue burden on nonbenefici-
aries.308 The fact that a statute incidentally benefits religion or 
makes an explicit reference to religion does not render it an unconsti-
tutional endorsement of religion.309 Two particular issues arise with 
health conscience clauses under the endorsement test. First, as ex-
plained previously, recent proposals, with some exceptions, grant an 
absolute accommodation to objecting providers. Second, benefits un-
der health conscience clauses appear to be offered to a broad range of 
personal beliefs.  
 
 305. Jamar, supra note 73, at 766. 
 306. Gey, supra note 67, at 533. 
 307. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 308. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (“Our decisions indicate that an 
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.”); 
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11-13, 18 n.8 (1989) (addressing whether benefits 
flow to nonreligious groups and whether the accommodation imposes a substantial burden 
on nonbeneficiaries).  
 309. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722-23 (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge even 
though religious beliefs were singled out for protection); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (stating 
that statutes alleviating burdens on religious groups are not invalid simply because they 
fail to afford similar benefits to secular entities). 
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 Although there is no clear line delineating when an accommoda-
tion turns into an impermissible advancement of religion,310 the Su-
preme Court has warned that absolute accommodations for religion 
are constitutionally intolerable.311 In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 
Inc., the Court struck down a Connecticut statute providing Sabbath 
observers with an unqualified right not to work on the Sabbath.312 
The Court found that the statute violated the Establishment Clause 
because it provided no exceptions and failed to give any consideration 
to the burdens placed on employers and nonbeneficiaries.313 “This 
unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other in-
terests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion 
Clauses.”314
 Despite Thornton, it is unlikely that recent health conscience laws 
violate the Establishment Clause. To invoke the First Amendment 
prohibition on establishing religion, federal or state law must afford 
preferential treatment to a religion or religions.315 Although many of 
the latest conscience clauses provide health care workers and entities 
with an absolute right to refuse services, they do not single out relig-
ion for special treatment or endorse particular religious practices. 
Mississippi’s statute and similar state proposals, with which this Ar-
ticle is primarily concerned, do not appear on their face to discrimi-
nate between religious beliefs and personal, moral, or ethical princi-
ples.316 If the statutes are construed to encompass secular ethical or 
moral refusals as well as religious conscientious objections, they are 
 
 310. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (“At some point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an 
unlawful fostering of religion.’ ”) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987).  
 311. Some commentators have also expressed the view that statutes which require 
employees to afford religious believers a heightened, but not absolute, level of accommoda-
tion beyond the de minimis level recognized in Title VII cases implicate the Establishment 
Clause. See Gregory J. Gawlik, Note, The Politics of Religion: “Reasonable Accommoda-
tions” and the Establishment Clause An Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 
47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 276 (1999) (arguing that the proposed Workplace Religious Free-
dom Act borders on “absolute” accommodation and is suspect under the Establishment 
Clause); Oleske, supra note 76, at 571 (noting that a heightened accommodation standard 
under Title VII increases the risk it will be subject to challenge under the Establishment 
Clause). However, the Supreme Court recently found RLUIPA consistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause even though it required a “ ‘compelling governmental interest’ ” before 
imposing a burden on prisoners’ religious exercise. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723. 
 312. 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985). 
 313. Id. at 709-10. 
 314. Id. at 710. 
 315. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11 (noting that a state’s award of unemployment 
benefits to religious observers did not single out a class of persons for favorable treat-
ment and did not endorse religion); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) 
(recognizing that where secular institutions are also granted an exemption, there is no 
favoritism of religion). 
 316. See discussion supra Part III.C. On the other hand, Illinois’ conscience statute 
recognizes a preference for religious refusals to render care. See supra note 111. 
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unlikely to be forbidden under the Establishment Clause.317 As Jus-
tice Harlan observed, “[a]s long as the breadth of exemption includes 
groups that pursue cultural, moral or spiritual improvement in mul-
tifarious secular ways, including, I would suppose, groups whose 
avowed tenets may be antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic, I can see 
no lack of neutrality in extending the benefit of the exemption to or-
ganized religious groups.”318 The converse is true as well. If the 
courts interpret health conscience clauses as intending to protect 
primarily beliefs arising out of religious traditions or tenets, they 
could be viewed as endorsing religion, even if the law also benefits 
secular beliefs.319  
B.   Conflicts with Federal and State Laws 
 Although they may not be prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause, broad conscience clauses that require absolute accommoda-
tion of health care conscientious objectors conflict with many federal 
and state statutes. Title VII, for instance, mandates only reasonable 
accommodation of employees’ religious beliefs and practices. Never-
theless, Title VII does not preempt state laws providing greater pro-
tection against employment discrimination. In California Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court observed that 
Congress disclaimed any intent to preempt state law or occupy the 
field of employment discrimination law.320 Title VII and other federal 
statutes prohibiting discrimination preempt health care refusal laws 
only if they directly conflict with the protections embedded in these 
laws.321 Rights of conscience would accordingly be inhibited by fed-
eral law proscribing provider discrimination against patients.322
 Conscience laws may also be attacked under state constitutions. 
Most states have adopted open courts provisions in their constitu-
 
 317. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73 (upholding property tax exemption accorded to reli-
gious institutions, in part, because the law granted an exemption to a broad range of non-
profit organizations); see also McConnell, supra note 67, at 699 (stating that the Estab-
lishment Clause is implicated “(o)nly if the benefits flow exclusively (or nearly so) to reli-
gious individuals or institutions”). 
 318. Walz, 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 319. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (finding a statute that authorized 
a period of silence for meditation in public schools unconstitutional because the statute had 
no purpose other than to return voluntary prayer to schools); see also Caldor, 472 U.S. at 
711 (stating that statute was invalidated because it “singles out Sabbath observers for spe-
cial . . . . protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious be-
liefs and practices of other private employees”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 320. 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (finding that California statute giving greater rights to 
pregnant workers was not preempted by Title VII because “Congress has explicitly dis-
claimed any intent categorically to pre-empt state law or to ‘occupy the field’ of employ-
ment discrimination law”). 
 321. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000); see also § 12201(b) (providing that the ADA does 
not invalidate state laws providing equal or greater protection for disabled individuals). 
 322. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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tions, guaranteeing the right to judicial access in common law ac-
tions.323 The open courts guarantee may be invoked to challenge a 
conscience clause’s restriction of the right to seek a remedy in medi-
cal malpractice or other well-established causes of action.324 Some 
state courts have been willing to strike statutes that completely ab-
rogate a right of access to the courts.325 Legislation that abolishes a 
remedy in civil actions only for patients harmed by religious or moral 
refusals of treatment would seem particularly suspect under state 
constitutional provisions. 
 Conflicts might also arise under state laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation against patients on the basis of their status, such as sexual 
orientation. A case pending in the California Supreme Court, al-
though not involving a conscience clause, demonstrates the tension 
that may occur between health care rights of refusal and expansive 
state discrimination laws.326 After eleven months of fertility treat-
ment at a San Diego clinic, the plaintiff, a lesbian, was denied in-
trauterine insemination (IUI).327 She filed suit under a California 
statute barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.328 
The defendants asserted that they refused to perform IUI on plaintiff 
not because of her sexual orientation, but because she was unmar-
ried and that their conduct was justified by their right to the free ex-
ercise of religion under the state and federal Constitutions.329 This 
case illustrates the difference between a professional or facility con-
scientiously refusing to provide a specific treatment, such as abor-
tion, and refusing to provide treatment due to a person’s status. 
 With respect to workplace disputes, courts may have to incorpo-
rate reasonable accommodation standards, even where none exists.330 
 
 323. See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1309, 1310 (2003) (stating that forty state constitutions explicitly or implicitly recognize a 
right of access to seek a remedy for civil wrongs).  
 324. Id. at 1312-13 (discussing use of the open courts provisions of state constitutions 
to strike down impediments to judicial access). 
 325. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (Ariz. 1984) (finding unconstitu-
tional a statute of limitations that barred an action for damages before it could reasonably 
be discovered); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001) (holding that 
the legislature may abolish a common law cause of action only if it provides a substitute rem-
edy in the event of injury); see also Phillips, supra note 323, at 1335-39 (discussing various 
approaches used by courts in addressing the remedies clause of state constitutions). 
 326. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review granted and opinion superseded, 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 605 (Cal. 2006).   
 327. Id. at. 638-41. 
 328. Id. at 638. 
 329. Id. 
 330. In several decisions, courts have engrafted the accommodation standard from Ti-
tle VII onto state abortion conscience statutes or other laws which appeared on their face 
to provide absolute protections for employees. See Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 
583 P.2d 860, 864 (Alaska 1978), vacated on other grounds on reh’g, 601 P.2d 584 (1979), 
appeal dismissed sub nom., Lumber, Prod. & Indus. Workers Local 2362 v. Wondzell, 444 
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Otherwise, pharmacies, hospitals, and other facilities may have a 
duty to accommodate the personal, moral, or ethical beliefs of every 
employee, resulting in potential disruptions in the delivery of health 
care. In the end, a statutory scheme that provides no right of redress 
for patients or regulatory bodies and no recourse for employers in the 
face of health care refusals may prove to be unworkable as well as le-
gally suspect. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Conscience clauses raise many difficult issues in a pluralistic soci-
ety. Health care providers have special obligations to patients that 
are not replicated in many other professional endeavors. Duties pre-
scribed by law and professional codes of conduct expect health care 
providers to act out of respect for the patient’s welfare and dignity. 
While no one suggests that health professionals should abandon 
their religious or moral principles, patients should not suffer harm or 
potential harm because of a belief they do not share. It is often ap-
propriate to accommodate individuals who wish to exercise their 
principles in the care of patients, but conscience clauses that promote 
blanket immunity for refusals to provide health care services resolve 
the tension between patient needs and provider autonomy in a one-
sided manner.  
 When health care providers deviate from standards of care, en-
gage in unprofessional conduct, or unduly burden their colleagues 
and employers through refusals to perform services, exemptions from 
malpractice, disciplinary, or employment actions are not appropriate. 
Patients should not be deprived of a right of redress through common 
law claims; immunity from malpractice actions for conscientious ob-
jections elevates moral reasons for harming a patient over other rea-
sons. Similarly, states have little interest in fostering unprofessional 
conduct even where patient harm does not occur. Accordingly, legis-
lators should not tie the hands of disciplinary boards in addressing 
such conduct.  
 The clamor for absolute immunity from employment actions for 
health care workers asserting moral refusals to treat demonstrates a 
myopic view of the burdens imposed by such objections on patients, 
employers, and coworkers. Despite protests to the contrary, the re-
 
U.S. 1040 (1980) (reading Title VII’s duty of reasonable accommodation into Alaska statute 
that forbid discrimination by employers and labor unions); Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of 
Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262, 1266-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that statute which 
provided that person refusing to participate in an abortion could not be disciplined or ter-
minated was violated when nurse was demoted to part-time status after refusal; court 
applied Title VII’s standard of accommodation even though statute included no reference 
to accommodation). 
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quirement under Title VII or similar state laws for reasonable ac-
commodation of health care employees has not been demonstrated to 
be ineffective to safeguard their rights. While recognizing the reli-
gious and moral values of employees, the courts have rightly looked 
askance at refusals to treat that endanger a patient’s health or safety 
or wreak havoc on a hospital’s or other entity’s ability to deliver care. 
Protections are in place to address adequately the refusal rights of 
health care workers. Although legislators may choose to heighten 
the de minimis accommodation standard under Title VII, abroga-
tion of the undue hardship test is not warranted from either a pol-
icy or legal prospective. 
 As shown by recent conscience legislation, some politicians seem 
to have forgotten that the overriding purpose of our health care sys-
tem is to protect the health and safety of patients. The expansion of 
refusal legislation to create immunity for health care providers who 
refuse any service for almost any reason is cause for alarm. Con-
science clauses fail to achieve a reasonable balance when they confer 
a special benefit on those whose religious, moral, or ethical beliefs 
compel them to deny health care while absolving them of the poten-
tially harmful consequences of their choices. By refusing to partici-
pate in health care services, a provider “may have eased her own 
conscience, but . . . neither benefited the society-at-large, the patient 
nor the patient’s family.”331   
 
 
 
 331. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1985). 
